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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Kathleen Merrow for the Master 
of Arts in History presented June 18, 1990. 
Title: Nietzsche's "Woman": A Metaphor Without Brakes 
APPROVED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: 
Susan C. Karant-~ \_____, 
Franklin C. West 
This thesis reconsiders the generally held view that 
Friedrich Nietzsche's works are misogynist. In doing so it 
provides an interpretation of Nietzsche's texts with respect 
to the metaphor "woman," sets this interpretation into an 
historical context of Nietzsche reception and follows the 
extension of Nietzsche's metaphor "woman" into French 
feminist theory. It provides an interpretation that shows 
that a misogynist reading of Nietzsche is in error because 
such a reading fails to consider the multiple perspectives 
that operate in Nietzsche's texts. 
Nietzsche's metaphors of "woman" -- far from being 
misogynist -- reveal a positive, affirmative "woman." His 
use of this metaphor radically dislocates traditional 
conceptions of the relationship masculine/feminine as it 
dislocates the "truth" of metaphysics. I argue that the 
metaphor "woman" is central to Nietzsche's attack on 
traditional philosophy and notions of truth. 
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Once "woman" is disentangled from notions of misogyny, 
I turn to a study of how Nietzsche has been interpreted from 
his own time to the present, paying attention to the point 
at which the "woman" in Nietzsche's texts acquires a 
significance and how this metaphor has (or has not) been 
read by Nietzsche's major interpreters. Given that the range 
of Nietzsche reception is very broad, extending through 
literature, social thought, politics, psychology, and 
philosophy, I have chosen to focus on Nietzsche's major 
philosophical readers, beginning with Nietzsche's own time 
and running through Heidegger and Derrida. This enables me 
to set my own interpretation within a context of Nietzsche 
reading. 
The last major chapter examines the relationship 
between Nietzsche and the major texts of French feminist 
criticism. My concern here is with the extension of 
Nietzsche's strategy of "woman" to radical feminist theory 
in the valorization of "woman" as difference and otherness 
and the use of this valorization to attack the patriarchal 
structure and history of language and thought. For these 
theoretical writers who would deconstruct even sexual 
identity, "woman" still functions in the Nietzschean sense 
in which she is no longer the opposite of man but the very 
subversion of the opposition masculinity/femininity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The writings of the enigmatic philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche have been subject to numerous, frequently 
conflicting interpretations during the one hundred years 
since he stopped writing, victim to a madness many believed 
symbolic of the radicalness of his thought. It is the very 
complex nature of this thought that has produced so many 
different views and different "Nietzsches.'' Even now, one 
commonplace of commentary on Nietzsche is that he was/is a 
misogynist however much significance is accorded his 
contributions to the thought of the twentieth century. 
Nietzsche's famous remark "You are going to women? Do not 
forget the whip!" is frequently cited in evidence of this 
misogyny. 1 It is part of my purpose to show how this reading 
of Nietzsche is the mistaken result of failing to take 
account of the multiple perspectives that operate in his 
works. There is no other way to show that the label misogyny 
does not apply to Nietzsche than to provide an 
interpretation of Nietzsche's texts that follows his use of 
the metaphor "woman" and his remarks on women. The riddle 
posed by "woman" plays a very significant role in 
Nietzsche's thought. Those readers who pay attention to this 
1 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1978) 67. 
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riddle, following Ariadne's thread through the labyrinthine 
structure of Nietzsche's writing, will discover therein a 
positive, affirmative "woman,'' one that radically dislocates 
traditional conceptions of the relationship 
masculine/feminine as it dislocates the "truth" of 
metaphysics. The question of Woman is posed in the first 
chapter of this thesis. 
Once "woman" is disentangled from notions of misogyny, 
I turn to a study of how Nietzsche has been interpreted from 
his own time to the present, paying attention to the point 
at which the "woman" in Nietzsche's texts acquires a special 
significance and how this metaphor has (or has not) been 
read by Nietzsche's major interpreters. I situate my own 
reading of Nietzsche in this context as a particular kind of 
interpretation. Previously, whether Nietzsche was labeled 
misogynist or not, his remarks on women were not believed to 
be important enough to be taken seriously philosophically. 
They could be ignored or dismissed, while his readers took 
on the explication of his "real" philosophy. The literary 
aspects of Nietzsche's texts were separated from his 
philosophical arguments. However, in French intellectual 
thought during the late 1960s and the 1970s the 
deconstructive nature of Nietzsche's texts as a kind of 
writing acquired significance within the 
stucturalist/poststructuralist debate over writing and the 
extension of this debate to the philosophical tradition by 
3 
Derrida. 2 The literary nature of philosophical writing as 
writing was now taken seriously (or philosophy was taken 
more playfully) and the separation between philosophy and 
literature rejected. 
In the context of this debate "woman" becomes a 
metaphor without brakes, proliferating in the texts of 
postmodernism as a Nietzschean valorization of the feminine 
as alterity and difference over the metaphysical concepts of 
identity and sameness. The last major chapter of this thesis 
deals with this process of valorization, particularly with 
the relationship between Nietzsche and the major texts of 
French feminist criticism -- the extension of Nietzsche's 
strategy of "woman" to a type of radical feminist theory. 
Thus my thesis provides both an interpretation and a 
reception history as the context for this interpretation and 
its extension to new debates. 
The use of the term "postmodernism" requires some 
explanation. Jean-Francois Lyotard defines the postmodern as 
"incredulity toward metanarrative."3 This can be expanded by 
saying that the difference between the modern and the 
postmodern is a difference in the status of the story 
2 Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1985) 11. 
3 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge, trans. Geof Bennington and Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) xxiv. 
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historical, literary, scientific, or philosophical. 
Modernist writers tend to believe and write as if a story 
could still be told in the form of a comprehensive narrative 
in which meaning has a unity as a whole and in which the 
identity, grammar, and vocabulary of literary language are 
assumed given. In postmodernist writing such conventions are 
abandoned, or if retained, then retained as arbitrary 
academic forms. Form and artifice no longer give solace. 
Meaning is multiple, no story privileged, nothing has 
explanatory power. 4 Throughout this thesis the words 
"theory," "form," "nature," "is," "represents," and other 
similar words are used. Given a certain academic form and 
approach that must be followed, these words are useful and 
unavoidable, yet under postmodern assumptions they cannot be 
used without irony. This must be kept in mind, particularly 
when the "object" of study is a group of texts bearing the 
signature "Nietzsche." In postmodernism (sometimes referred 
to as modernity) legitimation -- of theory, fact, knowledge 
has become "visible as a problem." Nietzsche fore-tells 
this twentieth century crisis of representation. 5 
4 Lyotard 71-82. 
5 By representation is meant "an essentially realistic 
epistemology, which conceives of representation as the 
reproduction, for subjectivity, of an objectivity that lies 
outside it, [and] projects a mirror theory of knowledge and 
art, whose fundamental evaluative categories are those of 
adequacy, accuracy, and Truth itself" (Jameson, "Foreword," 
to Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition viii). 
5 
At the end of the nineteenth century Nietzsche termed 
the first manifestation of this crisis Nihilism. In 
Nietzsche's time this appeared as a general cultural 
dislocation in a period of great social, political, and 
cultural change in Germany and elsewhere. Nietzsche was a 
severe critic of the products of these changes -- German 
nationalism, anti-semitism, industrialism and the 
development of middle class values, philosophical pessimism, 
cultural decline, and sterility. Culture was widely believed 
to be shallow and decadent. 6 But even more so he was a 
critic of the rise of positivistic science and scientism in 
the second half of the nineteenth century to the status of 
near religious faith. 7 This scientism accompanied a loss of 
religious faith on the part of many. 8 Nietzsche repudiates 
both the Christian religion and the faith in science as 
symptoms of the same problem the devaluation of this 
world for (an)other world, a beyond posited on 
God/Truth/Reason which could provide the truths and 
certainty lacking to our immediate senses and provide man a 
false sense of comfort in his ability to "know." 
6 Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany: 1840-1945 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969) 393; Henri F. 
Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious (New York: 
Basic Books, 1970) 281. 
7 Ellenberger 226. 
8 Holborn 121. 
Nietzsche's contemporaries emphasized the polemical 
aspects of his works -- his attacks on culture, morality, 
religion, and science. 9 However, it is not Nietzsche's 
cultural criticisms that are important here, nor his 
relationship to his philosophical peers and predecessors, 
but his diagnosis of nihilism as the most pervasive problem 
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of his/our time. Nihilism here refers to the loss of eternal 
standards encompassed in Nietzsche's statement that "God is 
dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him."10 The loss 
had occurred and, Nietzsche argued, could not be recovered 
by traditional means. Nietzsche, more than his 
contemporaries, discerned the future significance of this 
loss of values and meaning. As he says further in the 
parable of the madman: 
I have come too early ... my time is not yet. 
This tremendous event is still on its way, 
still wandering; it has not yet reached the 
ears of men. Lightening and thunder require 
time; the light of the stars requires time; 
deeds, though done, still require time to be 
seen and heard. This deed is still more 
distant from them than the most distant Ilars 
-- and yet they have done it themselves. 
The search for Truth has undermined itself by a process of 
internal erosion, even if this erosion had, in Nietzsche's 
9 Ellenberger 272. 
lO Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Kaufmann (New 
York: Random House, 1974) §125; Allan Megill, Prophets of 
Extremity: Nietzsche. Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida 
(Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1985) xiii. 
11 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §125. 
time, not reached the surface or affected the faith in 
science. The distant thunder that Nietzsche had the ears to 
hear has become close and loud in the twentieth century. 
Nietzsche's great problem, as Walter Kaufmann has put 
it/ is 
to escape nihilism -- which seems involved 
both in asserting the existence of God and 
thus robbing this world of ultimate 
significance, and also denying God and thus
12 robbing everything of meaning and value ... 
What new story can be told to affirm life and human meaning 
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when there are no meanings and patterns in existence itself? 
Nietzsche moves away from Schopenhauerian pessimism toward 
"a justification of life, even at its most terrible, 
ambiguous, and mendacious. 1113 How does one restore the 
mythic element to a culture that has become "analytical and 
inartistic?1114 The affirmation of new values requires the 
willingness to question all values up until now. Nietzsche 
will revalue -- or reinterpret -- the very idea of truth, 
rejecting metaphysics and the mediation of things through 
concepts. Nietzsche was not alone in the nineteenth century 
in criticizing the idea that concepts do not mediate things 
12 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher. 
Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1974) 101. 
13 Nietzsche, The Will to Power trans. Kaufmann and 
Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968) §1005; Megill 43. 
14 Megill 78. 
and that no immediate knowledge of the world is possible. 15 
However, where others attempted to find new possibilities 
for mediation, Nietzsche would reject mediation altogether 
and argue for the metaphorical nature of thought, language, 
and truth -- truth as illusion, as a process of 
interpretation that goes all the way down. The recognition 
that truth is a matter of interpretation opens the way to a 
new creativity --
At long last the horizon appears free to us 
again ... the sea, our sea, lies open again; 
perhaps there has never yet been such an 
"open sea."i 6 
15 Megill 47. 
16 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §343. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE WOMAN IN NIETZSCHE'S TEXTS: AN INTERPRETATION 
Supposing truth is a woman -- what 
then? Are there not grounds for the 
suspicion that all philosophers, 
insofar as they were dogmatists, 
have been very inexpert about women? 
That the gruesome seriousness, the 
clumsy obtrusiveness with which they 
have usually approached truth so far 
have been awkward and very improper 
methods for winning a woman's heart? 
What is certain is that she has not 
allowed herself to be won -- and 
today every kind of dogmatism is left 
standing dispirited and discouraged. 
If it is left standing at all! 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good 
and Eyil 
Truth, Wisdom, Eternity, Ideality, Philosophy, Beauty 
have been woman since the time of the Greeks. 
Nietzsche's use of this metaphorical "woman" should not 
surprise anyone, except for the unusual, paradoxical twists 
he gives her. Nietzsche's use of this and other commentary 
on "woman" and her metaphorical presence within 
philosophical texts serves to question the traditional 
philosophical meaning given to concepts like truth, and 
constitutes a major part of his attack on traditional 
philosophy. Although we can only interpret these metaphors 
through carefully reading other sentences in Nietzsche's 
texts that use the same words and following the different 
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descriptions and values given them, we can not add up the 
various ways in which these words are used and arrive at "a" 
single meaning. In examining their role within Nietzsche's 
texts I shall begin with a consideration of these metaphors, 
as they appear in Nietzsche's texts and as they embody his 
major themes, not, however, as if they are mere figurative 
decoration for underlying concepts, but in their own right. 
In interpreting Nietzsche's writing it is important 
never to take any individual remark out of its context. One 
can easily argue the case for Nietzsche the misogynist by 
reading only his seemingly more offensive statements 
literally or argue the case for a "feminist" Nietzsche by 
emphasizing only the positive statements. This is not the 
simpleminded mistake that it at first seems, because 
Nietzsche's texts are ambiguous and the contexts that can be 
applied to his metaphors multiple. The theme of "woman'' in 
Nietzsche's texts is intimately bound up with what is called 
his perspectivism, his metaphor of the will to power as the 
basis of all life, and the affirmation of life as will to 
power given in the eternal return and the self-overcoming of 
the overman. 1 If Nietzsche's remarks about "woman" must be 
taken together and read within the larger context of his 
complete writings and interpreted according to his major 
themes, then the only way to arrive at any assessment of 
what (if anything) the metaphors "truth is a woman" or "life 
1 Kaufmann 307-333. 
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is a woman" might mean is to begin with one of these themes 
and work through them. One point of entry into Nietzsche's 
interpretation is the quotation that begins this chapter, 
the opening statement from the Preface to Beyond Good and 
.Etil.. Before any meaning can be assigned to "woman" in the 
Nietzschean phrase "truth is a woman," the question of truth 
must be asked. 
The context that immediately presents itself is that 
truth is to be reconsidered as something other than what the 
dogmatists have believed it to be -- that is, facts and 
concepts that correspond to and represent the world as 
provided by reason through the use of logic. Why "woman?" In 
Nietzsche's texts woman is characterized by appearance: 
But she does not want truth: what is truth to 
woman? From the beginning, nothing has been 
more alien, repugnant,_ and hostile to woman 
than truth -- her great art is the lie, her 
highest concern is mere appearance and 
beauty. Let us men confess it: we honor and 
love precisely this art and this instinct in 
woman -- we who have a hard time and for our 
relief like to associate with beings under 
whose hands, eyes, and tender follies our 
seriousness, our gravity and pr9fundity 
almost appear to us like folly. 
Woman is truth, but truth that is paradoxically a 
"lie," not truth that is "true" and therefore hostile. 
Nietzsche speaks of lying in his essay On Truth and Lying in 
an Extra Moral Sense, saying that "truths are illusions 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage books, 1966) § 232. 
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about which it has been forgotten that they are illusions," 
a metaphorical process that begins with perception itself . 3 
In this process, a nerve stimulus is translated into an 
image which is in turn translated into a sound and words, 
which in turn become concepts. In each step a carrying over 
occurs between different bodily spheres where no literal 
translation is possible -- we lack an "organ" for truth. 4 
Further, each perceptual metaphor is unique, yet the 
perceptual process involves ordering our perceptions 
according to similarity and sameness. It treats different 
things as the same, in other words, metaphorically. 5 
Concepts point out only the relation of things to man, not 
the things themselves. There is no ground or permanent 
domain of literal meaning that serves as a reference for the 
metaphorical. What is called literal are those metaphors 
that have become dead, whose metaphorical meaning has been 
forgotten or worn away. 6 
Nietzsche is saying that we need to recognize what we 
are doing. We must adopt a good will towards appearance (it 
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lying in an Extra 
Moral Sense trans. in Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and 
Language, Gilman, Blair, Parent, eds. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989) 250. 
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science §354. 
5 Lawrence Hinman, "Nietzsche, Metaphor and Truth," 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (1982): 185. 
6 Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lying" 250. 
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is precisely this we love in woman). Dogmatic philosophers 
mistakenly deny our senses and idealize reason, positing a 
"real" world behind or beyond them that is accessible 
through reason. Nietzsche is rejecting both the idea of a 
transcendental world by reference to which this world is 
illusory and the idea that the world is immediately present 
to us. Thus the world is illusory -- a hyperbolic way of 
saying that all our truths are mediated. They allow us to 
function and make calculations but we can not claim they are 
true of any "real" world in itself. The apparent world is 
not opposed to the true world -- it is the world as it 
appears. 
Ultimately all relations of truth and language become 
functions of metaphor and thus of art. The human is an 
artist for whom metaphor is the fundamental vehicle of 
thought. Life becomes an aesthetic phenomenon (and we love 
precisely this art and this instinct in woman) and as an 
aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us." 7 
It must be emphasized that Nietzsche is not denying that 
truth is possible but saying that it is a heuristic device 
that has no claims to describing the way things are in 
themselves, only as they are for us. Truth is language -- we 
think only in the form of language8 -- and language is the 
7 Nietzsche, Gay Science §107. 
8 Nietzsche, The Will to Power §522. 
lie that protects humanity from the hostile chaos of the 
universe (her great art is the lie -- woman is so 
artistic). 9 Language is the mediating function between us 
and the worldlO -- and if we abolish the "true" world then 
we abolish the "apparent" world as well. There is only the 
world, the whole, chaotic becoming, as we see it 
perspectively. 11 There is no absolute truth. 
14 
In attempting to use metaphors in a way that shows the 
functioning of metaphors through a series of paradoxical 
substitutions, Nietzsche has the "impossible task of 
defining in unambiguous signs (Truth is ... ) the functioning 
of signs. 12 Thus Nietzsche's texts undermine themselves in a 
way that shows that all such undermining of foundations is 
inevitable. Critic J. Hillis Miller says of Nietzsche's 
essay on truth and lying that 
9 Nietzsche, Gay Science §361. 
lO Alan D. Schrift, "Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric: 
Nietzsche's Deconstruction of Epistemology" Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 23 (1985): 373. 
11 Nietzsche, Gay Science §109. 
12 J.Hillis Miller, "Dismembering and Disremembering in 
Nietzsche's 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense'" in Hb.y 
Nietzsche Now?, ed. Daniel O'Hara (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1985) 47. 
[the] human world, for Nietzsche as for 
Freud, in their different ways, is a 
labyrinth of figurative displacements around 
an unknown center. What Nietzsche names 
"metaphor," "illusion," "transposition," or 
"dissimulation" is originally a catachresis. 
It replaces the unknown X with a sign which 
is neither literal nor figurative. In this it 
undermines the distinction between the truth 
of literal language and the lie of figurative 
language which is the foundation of 
N~etzsche'i 3construction of the labyrinth of his essay. 
Once the opposition between the "real" and "apparent" 
worlds is done away with in favor of the world that simply 
appears, and in which appearances are never replaced with 
the "real" but only with new appearances, or new 
perspectives, the way is cleared for creative 
interpretation14 There is no "natural" world as in "the 
nature of things," only interpretations as human 
15 
creations. 15 The world is a work of art that gives birth 
to itself. 16 With interpretation and multiplicity the 
individual is free to play, to "overcome the spirit of 
gravity" and seriousness (women can make seriousness and 
gravity "appear like folly"). What is valued is not the 
uncovering of a reality but the interpretation itself. 
13 Miller, "Dismembering ... " 45. 
14 Alphonso Lingis, "The Will to Power," in The New 
Nietzsche, ed. David B. Allison (New York: Dell Publishing 
Company, 1977) 43. 
15 Allan Megill 30-32. 
16 Nietzsche, Will to Power §796. 
16 
The relationship between art and truth is a fundamental 
aspect of Nietzsche's thought, where art is both the form 
and the means for illusion as our only way of apprehending 
the world -- art is that "good will towards appearance. 1117 
Paradoxically, only art is true because it treats appearance 
as appearance. In questions of art, truth, and appearance in 
Nietzsche's texts, "woman" is a primary metaphor. "Woman" is 
thus also fundamental to Nietzsche's texts, where she 
appears in many guises, one more of which is the Vita 
Femina: 
But perhaps this is the most powerful magic 
of life: it is covered by a veil interwoven 
with gold, a veil of beautiful possibilities, 
sparkling with promise, resistance, 
bashfulness, mockery, 1~ity, and seduction. Yes, life is a woman. 
The vita femina becomes a "central image of Nietzsche's 
metaphorical thought about meta-phor. 1119 She is appearance 
as art, the veil thrown over existence that makes it 
bearable. Life is change and chaos, where every "being" is a 
plurality of forces and multiple meanings that is both 
affected and effects within a field of forces in which power 
is the differential element. 20 What is, is the whole: a 
17 Nietzsche, Gay Science §107. 
18 Nietzsche, Gay Science §339. 
19 Eric Blonde!, "Nietzsche: Life as Metaphor" in ~ 
Nietzsche 151. 
20 Lingis, "The Will to Power" 51. 
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world of effects that are reinterpreted, and this 
interpretation/reinterpretation is the will to power. Again, 
"woman" as a metaphor for life leads us back to Nietzsche's 
important themes. 
The world as will to power 21 is becoming, difference, 
plurality -- not being, identity, unity. It is not the 
Hegelian assimilation of what is other but an affirmation of 
difference -- the pathos of distance. 22 Knowing is no 
longer finding but creating. As such it is the ability to 
command a perspective of something -- without forgetting 
that it is a perspective. Although Nietzsche accords to the 
desire to fix and order things a necessity for life, he also 
attributes it to the common or the herd mentality and 
rejects it in favor of the individual, the unique, the 
ability to live without fixed values. 
Throughout Nietzsche's texts life and the individual's 
relation to life are written about in sexual terms: 
creation, birth, potency, fertility, violation, love, 
penetration, castration, marriage, seduction, temptation, 
21 "Will to power" is a difficult term because 
Nietzsche does not believe that there is any single "will" 
or any "who wills?" Neither is power simply identified with 
crude force. As Nietzsche says, it is not "I will" but "it 
wills" -- the idea of ego, the subject, or substance is 
already an interpretation that is the result of a struggle 
of forces, an interpretation already made that we only react 
to. The will to power is best characterized as 
interpretation -- the legislation of a point of view. 
22 Lingis, "The Will to Power" 41. 
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death, violence, destruction, voyeurism, sterility ... The 
metaphor "woman" and her relation to "man" is so central 
that Nietzsche does not write about truth, life, knowledge, 
spirit, art, wisdom, or the will to power, eternal return, 
and the overman without using these terms. Nietzsche uses 
male/female sexual imagery to say metaphorically what cannot 
be said otherwise. Sexuality becomes one mask of the 
metaphor for the relation between art and truth that is life 
itself. 
In this relationship the artist as the warrior against 
the ascetic ideal is ambiguously potent/fertile, 
male/female, giving/taking, hard/tender, and active/reactive 
but never in the sense that these are opposites. 23 Wisdom 
is a woman who wants only such warriors, those who can laugh 
and kill the spirit of gravity. This spirit belongs to the 
ascetic interpretation of life as a burden and suffering for 
which someone must be blamed. According to Nietzsche, 
ultimately the sufferers are led to blame themselves and 
burdened with guilt and sin, redeemed only in another world 
"beyond" this one. The ascetic view is itself an affirmation 
of life in that it offers an interpretation of suffering 
that both explains and justifies it, yet in claiming to be 
23 And in implicating "woman" in the discourse about 
truth and logic Nietzsche is already suggesting 
(posthumously?) the deconstruction of phallogocentrism that 
is made within contemporary literary/philosophical 
criticism, most notably by Jacques Derrida (See Chapter 
I I I). 
19 
true for all, disguises its nature as interpretation and 
presents itself as unconditional truth. Thus Nietzsche views 
the ascetic as encompassing not only Christianity, but 
metaphysics and science, all of which posit some other world 
that redeems appearance. In the case of science this is a 
set of "natural" laws and explanation that cease to be 
heuristic devices and are claimed true of the "real" world 
on the basis of a set of unquestioned propositions or first 
principles. 
Culture and life as metaphor and metaphorical are a 
displacement, a separation of thought from the body, which 
is displaced through language, as "surface" phenomena. 24 The 
body is unknown and speaks only through signs man's 
"nature" is already second nature, the result of a primeval 
and unconscious struggle of impulses of which we only 
experience the result. Life as such is a sickness in the 
form of bad consciousness, or the repression of our 
instincts, a repression that nevertheless is necessary for 
24 Giles Deleuze, "Active and Reactive" in .Nfil'.l 
Nietzsche 80; Eric Blonde!, "Nietzsche's Style of 
Affirmation: The Metaphors of Genealogy" in Nietzsche as 
Affirmative Thinker, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel 
(Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1986) 135. 
our survival. 25 Yet, for Nietzsche, this sickness is a 
"sickness like pregnancy," both sick and productive at the 
same time, and "man" was the result. 26 "Woman" thus gives 
birth to humanity and culture. "Woman" gives birth to 
sublimation and over-coming. 27 As Zarathustra says, 
Everything about woman is a riddle, and 
everything about woman has one solution: that 
is pregnancy. Man is for woman a means: the 
end is a~~ays the child. But what is woman 
for man? 
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25 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (with~ 
li.Qm.Q) trans. Walter Kaufmann (Canada: Random House, 1969) 
Section II, §16: "All instincts that do not discharge 
themselves outwardly turn inward -- this is what I call the 
internalization of man ... But thus began the gravest and 
uncanniest illness, from which humanity has not yet 
recovered, man's suffering of man, of himself -- the result 
of a forcible sundering from his animal past .... Let us add 
at once that, on the other hand, the existence on earth of 
an animal soul turned against itself, taking sides against 
itself, was something so new, profound, unheard of, 
enigmatic, contradictory, and pregnant with a future that 
the aspect of the earth was essentially altered." 
26 Blonde!, "Nietzsche: Life as Metaphor" 153. 
27 Eric Blonde!, to whose reading of the vita femina I 
owe part of my own interpretation, interprets Nietzsche's 
vita femina alongside Freud's notion of primal repression as 
the origin of consciousness. Thus Blonde! looks for the 
"father" if woman is the "mother" of culture. He locates the 
dead father in the repressed body (154), and says, "The 
culture she gives birth to begins with the initial lie, 
which is the repression of the body, the dissimulation of 
the father" (156). Blonde! brings in the figure of Oedipus 
-- one must forget the murder of the father or face madness, 
tragedy, and death (163). Yet against this one must recall 
Nietzsche's redefinition of Oedipus as the hero who decides 
to live with what he knows. Tracy Strong in "Oedipus as 
Hero: Family and Family Metaphors in Nietzsche" in Hh.Y 
Nietzsche Now? argues for a Nietzsche that thus redefines 
Oedipus (318). Nietzsche himself is not interested in the 
father, but in "male mothers." 
28 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 66. 
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As the metaphor of metaphor woman is ambiguous and 
wears multiple masks. She can be misread, as the 
metaphysical idealists do when they congeal the vita femina 
into an ideal, that of the Eternal Feminine, which is based 
on a principle of identity that turns active creativity into 
voyeurism and necrophilia. 29 What is fixed is hostile to 
life, as metaphysical truth is hostile to woman. "Woman" is 
displacement itself, which can be figured but not 
represented. 
Life as "woman" is also life as will to power, and thus 
not passive. It is both force, commanding, and overcoming, 
as well as what must be commanded. Woman as nature is woman 
as nature's power and the joy in artistic semblance which 
transforms the insight into the horror of existence into a 
knowledge that both obscures and reveals this existence. In 
Nietzsche's characterization, life is Dionysian. Woman here 
is associated with the female maenad, a creative and 
destructive priestess of Dionysus who "tears to pieces when 
she loves" and inspires fear and reverence in the face of 
the chaos of existence. 30 The Dionysian is the affirmation 
of totality -- the "tragic man affirms even the harshest 
suffering. 1131 Dionysus is "he who no longer denies," who can 
29 Blonde!, "Nietzsche: Life as Metaphor'' 161. 
3o Nietzsche, Ecce Homo §5; Nietzsche, Beyond Good and 
.EJli.l §239. 
31 Nietzsche, Will to Power §1052. 
affirm suffering and "redeem" existence. 32 Life is 
collective continuation through procreation and sexuality 
change as continual creation. 33 
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Nietzsche's early work The Birth of Tragedy begins his 
analysis of the Dionysian in terms of its role in early 
Greek culture and the archetypal forces embodied in the 
Greek deities Dionysus and Apollo. Apollo signifies the 
imposition of form through the plastic and poetic arts on 
the formless flux of becoming that is signified by Dionysus. 
Greek Tragedy, which was connected with the Dionysian 
religion, was able to affirm form (as a temporary ordering 
of chaos) and create meaning while recognizing the 
destructive power of life. However, the advent of Platonic 
rationality ruptured the unity of the Apollonian and the 
Dionysian and gave precedence to the principle of form. For 
Nietzsche, this elevation of being as unchanging form which 
became the criterion of truth was a falsification of the 
appropriate emergence of form as a process of creation out 
of formlessness in the aesthetic mode of creativity -- form 
which admits its deceptive character. 34 Thus began Western 
culture and the alienation of man from his instincts and 
32 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols ( with The Anti-
christ), trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin, 1968) 
110 and 54. 
33 Nietzsche, Will to Power §1049. 
34 Lawrence Hatab, "Nietzsche on Woman," Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 19 (1981): 337 
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from life as change and creativity. Here we can see the 
context for Nietzsche's critique of "Truth." 
Further, in pre-Socratic Greek culture, Dionysian 
mythology expressed the cyclic regeneration of nature, the 
idea that the whole is indestructible. The Dionysian was a 
cult of women, worshippers of a god that was frequently 
characterized as androgynous and associated with pre-
Hellenic mother goddesses. Nietzsche adopted his use of the 
terms Apollonian and Dionysian from J.J. Bachofen's work on 
myth and mother right, in which Dionysus has the ambiguous 
nature of a phallic god that served to intensify feminine 
power. The Dionysian, for Bachofen, represents a stage in 
the rise of the Apollonian patriarchal principle that was 
still tied to the feminine association with the earth and 
sensuality "The phallic god cannot be thought of 
separately from feminine materiality."35 For Bachofen, as 
for Nietzsche, the Apollonianism that characterized later 
Hellenic society represented the "triumph" of motherless 
paternity and immutable form. However, where Bachofen 
regarded this as progress in the social order, Nietzsche 
clearly did not. According to Lawrence Hatab: 
3 5 J.J. Bachofen, Myth. Religion. and Mother Right, 
trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1967). 
In general, one could accurately summarize 
the cross-cultural features of the masculine-
feminine duality as follows: the masculine = 
light, knowledge, construction, 
consciousness, form; the feminine = darkness, 
mystery, destruction, unconsciousness, 
formlessness. So in this sense the Dionysian 
cu~t :epre~~nted the worship of the feminine 
pr1nc1ple. 
Hatab has suggested that "woman" perhaps represents for 
Nietzsche "a specific battle in which he fights for the 
preservation of the Dionysian." 37 It also indicates the 
ancient basis for Western stereotypes, within which 
24 
Nietzsche is valorizing "woman" in an attempt to revalue the 
values of Western culture, albeit in terms that 20th century 
women might reject. 
This ecstatic affirmation of life as appearance 
requires strength and struggle. It is this attitude toward 
life that is figured in the famous remark about the whip in 
Zarathustra in the section "On Little Old and Young Women." 
Here Zarathustra speaks of women to an old woman he has met, 
who then in turn tells him a ''little truth" about women 
"You are going to women? Do not forget the whip!" 38 
Zarathustra does not forget. Speaking to Life in "The Other 
Dancing Song" he says "Keeping time with my whip, you shall 
36 Hatab 338. 
37 Hatab 337. Hatab even suggests that "the 'place' of 
the feminine, for Nietzsche, reflects a Dionysian 
superiority [and] ironically ... it would not be difficult 
to interpret Nietzsche's philosophy literally as a 
'feminism'!"(339). 
38 Nietzsche, Zarathustra 67. 
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dance and cry! Or have I forgotten the whip? Not I!" 39 The 
context for both remarks is Nietzsche's insistence that life 
requires a struggle -- and it is not clear to whom the whip 
belongs. Elsewhere in Zarathustra Nietzsche refers to the 
"evil tamers of beasts," a reference to those dogmatists and 
practitioners of the ascetic ideal who force life and truth 
into false, frozen forms as the lion tamer uses a whip on 
circus lions. 40 
Nietzsche frequently uses situations, plot fragments, 
phrases, or characterizations that cue references to other 
texts. In the section "On Little Old and Young Women" we are 
cued to pull Plato into our reading when the old woman asks 
Zarathustra what he has hidden under his cloak -- a 
reference to the Phaedrus and the written scroll that 
Phaedrus has hidden under his cloak. With Plato in mind we 
have no trouble seeing in the figure of the old woman the 
Diotima of Plato's Symposium, who is the woman who spoke to 
Socrate's soul and gave him his teachings about love, just 
as Zarathustra's old woman gives him his truth about woman. 
By subtle allusion, Nietzsche is reminding us of his 
revaluation of Platonic thought by "removing" the Socratic 
interpretation of Diotima's philosophy, in which human love 
for another is the first step up the ladder towards the 
3 9 Nietzsche, Zarathustra 226. 
4o Nietzsche, Zarathustra 195. 
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contemplation of perfect form, and restoring -- in the 
compressed metaphor of the whip -- the pre-Socratic view of 
life as becoming and struggle for power. Bachofen describes 
Diotima as a figure of pre-Hellenic mystery mother 
religion. 41 By alluding to her Nietzsche can refer again to 
life as feminine procreation. 
While Diotima is only an allusion, one female figure in 
Nietzsche's writing bears a name: the mythological figure of 
Ariadne. She is important to Nietzsche's telling of the 
Eternal Return and its relation to the Dionysian. Nietzsche 
believed that myth was a central element of culture, one 
reduced to mere fiction by the time of the 19th century. 42 
Myth depends on instinct and acceptance, and is dissolved by 
rationality and science. The Eternal-Return in Nietzsche's 
work has elements of a new myth, one that can give life 
meaning in the face of the loss of the old myths and modern 
humanity's homelessness. Myth provides for Nietzsche a 
system of unconscious, non-conceptual knowledge that can 
unite the participants of a particular culture. 43 As the 
41 Bachofen 90. Andrea Nye, in her essay "The Hidden 
Host: Irigary and Diotima at Plato's Symposium," makes a 
very Nietzschean argument: "Understood in historical 
context, Diotima is not an anomaly in Platonic discourse, 
but the hidden host of Plato's banquet, speaking for a pre-
Socratic world view against which classical Greek thought is 
asserted" (Hypatia 3 (Winter, 1989): 45). 
42 Megill 72. 
43 Megill 82. 
thinker of the Eternal-Return, Nietzsche is creating new 
values, not only criticizing old ones. For Nietzsche, myth 
is, as faith is for Pascal, an illusion to which we choose 
to submit, and thus becomes not only the subject but the 
very form art takes. 
The Eternal-Return as myth becomes a story that can 
transfigure the thinker. 44 The world is such that if 
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anything ever recurred again, everything else would have to 
recur again. 45 All the accidents and fortuitous connections 
that combine to create a single individual are crucial. Thus 
the highest form of the affirmation of one's life and self 
is not merely the acceptance of life -- as change, 
appearance, will to power -- but the willingness to accept 
the exact same life over and over again. Everything is 
connected. As Nietzsche says, this affirmation is such 
that one wants nothing to be different, not 
forward, not backward, not in all eternity. 
Not merely bear what is necessary, still less 
conceal it -- all idealism is mendaciousness 
~n ~ge face of what is necessary -- but love 
it. 
4 4 Lingis, "The Will to Power" 59. 
45 Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) 6. 
46 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 258. This becomes a powerful 
psychological tool in providing meaning to life in the 
absence of meaning. 
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Life in itself is meaningless. It has only the value an 
individual or a society can give it. 47 To accept the present 
is to accept everything that has happened in creating it. 
One must reinterpret the past according to future goals in 
such a way that nothing is cause for the resentment or 
rejection that comes from brooding about what is past. In 
part this goal is the creation of a self. Nietzsche denies 
the unity of the self in its givenness, claiming that it is 
an abstraction based on reduction -- a surface phenomenon 
and interpretation. 
This affirmation is intricately bound up with 
Ariadne/Dionysus, especially in Nietzsche's later works. 
Nietzsche's remark "Who apart from me knows what Ariadne 
is!" has puzzled and intrigued many interpreters. 48 
Historically, Ariadne is associated with Dionysus, Theseus, 
and the Labyrinth of Greek mythology. In most versions of 
the myth, Ariadne leads Theseus out of the labyrinth by a 
thread, after which he abandons her and she marries Dionysus 
and/or dies. 49 In Nietzsche's version of the myth (found not 
only in published works but in his Nachlass), Ariadne 
47 Nehamas 135. 
48 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 308. Ariadne is a "what," not a 
"who." Many of Nietzsche's readers look for Ariadne in 
figures from Nietzsche's biography such as Cosima Wagner 
(most notably Walter Kaufmann), ignoring the place of 
Ariadne within Nietzsche's writing. 
49 Edith Hamilton, Mythology (Boston: Little, Brown, 
and Company, 1942) 67; Hamilton 215-216. 
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rejects Theseus, who represents pity, and chooses the 
labyrinth as active nihilism or "one's fate in the spirit of 
amor fati" -- Nietzsche's affirmation of the Eternal-
Return. 50 Ariadne can be seen as human suffering transformed 
by the Dionysian experience. 
As tragic sufferer, Ariadne takes on many of the 
aspects previously assigned to Zarathustra. In "The Lament 
of Ariadne" in Nietzsche's Dionysos Dithyrambs she is 
referred to as "the loneliest one," as was Zarathustra in 
his confrontation with the dwarf at the gateway Augenblick 
that is a reference to the Eternal-Return. 51 She must 
overcome her pity for humanity, and chose the affirmation of 
life in death and suffering, tasks that are also 
Zarathustra's. The section of Zarathustra called "On the 
Great Longing" was originally titled "Ariadne" in 
Nietzsche's notes, a section addressed to Zarathustra's soul 
-- a reference which survives in numerous allusions to the 
secret of the soul, labyrinths, riddles, and threads. 52 
Ariadne is the transvaluation of all values in the dithyramb 
and is perhaps Dionysus' first disciple (a discipleship 
Nietzsche also attributes to himself). Dionysus becomes the 
SO Adrian Del Caro, "Symbolizing Philosophy: Ariadne 
and the Labyrinth,'' Nietzsche-Studien 17 (1988): 140. 
51 Reference to Ariadne: Del Caro 155; Reference to 
Zarathustra: Nietzsche, Zarathustra 156. 
52 Del Caro 137. 
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"Tempter god" who is the catalyst for our need to enter the 
labyrinth, there either to overcome or become lost. 53 
In an interpretation of "The Lament of Ariadne" Karl 
Reinhardt (1935) makes much of this transformation in 
gender. Dionysus becomes a new myth that replaces 
Zarathustra for a Nietzsche who no longer "keeps at arms 
length the possibility of [such] deifications."54 "The 
Sorcerer's Song" in Zarathustra, sung in distress by the 
Magician whom Zarathustra beats as an ascetic of the 
spirit, 55 becomes "The Lament of Ariadne'' in the Dithyrambs, 
which changes the masculine endings to feminine ones and 
adds a dramatic epilogue in which Dionysus appears "in 
emerald beauty" telling Ariadne "I am your labyrinth." 56 
Instead of earning a beating, the one who invokes the god is 
heard through a re-interpretation, a change of roles: "A 
masculine ending comes to be replaced by a feminine. 1157 Yet 
the change is still ambiguous, the dithyramb "labyrinthine." 
Nietzsche halts at invoking new gods, earlier in Beyond Good 
53 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §370; Beyond Good and 
.EYi.l §29 and §295. 
54 Karl Reinhardt, "Nietzsche's Lament of Ariadne'' 
Interpretation 6/3 (October, 1977): 216-217. 
55 Nietzsche, Zarathustra 256. 
56 Reinhardt 221. Also see David Farrell Krell 
Postponements: Women. Sensuality. and Death in Nietzsche 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986) 19. 
57 Reinhardt 220. 
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and Evil even suggesting the possibility that the Eternal 
Return might be a "circulus vitiosus deus" the vicious 
circle. 58 He had used Zarathustra's cudgel to strike away 
the ascetic of the spirit when he had had enough of his 
song. 59 Reinhardt suggests that to unravel this mystery one 
must unravel the thread out of the labyrinth that "winds out 
into one's own hand." 60 One way to avoid or at least 
postpone the construction of new gods while speaking new 
truths is to parody constantly the form in which these 
truths are represented. This parody is pronounced throughout 
Nietzsche's texts in the figure of "woman." 61 
Just as "woman" figures what is highest in Nietzsche's 
thought, "woman" also figures what is lowest. In Nietzsche's 
writing the reactive woman appears alongside the affirmative 
woman -- one must be the master of many perspectives to 
58 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §56. 
59 Nietzsche, Zarathustra 255-256. 
GO Reinhardt 222. 
61 David Farrell Krell picks up Reinhardt's suggestion 
of the halt Nietzsche makes at this point. His thesis is 
that of a tragic Ariadne that Nietzsche postponed -- an 
Ariadne that represents the configuration 
Woman/Sensuality/Death. The women in Nietzsche's texts 
become duplicities (again the vicious circle) that are kept 
at a distance. There can be no straightforward revelation of 
Dionysos. The Eternal-Return is announced in the figure of 
Zarathustra, who "postpones the consequences of his own 
teaching, invents a consolation for himself, flirts with 
eternity" -- a postponement of the tragedy that is yet "in 
pursuit, relentlessly." It is the hand of woman holding the 
thread that Nietzsche comes back to, a hand that Nietzsche 
himself writes with ... (85-87). 
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"know women." Most of Nietzsche's more notorious remarks 
about women are to be found among his analysis of the 
reactive, negative, life-denying perspective. Nietzsche 
claims, as a master of perspectives, to be able to reverse 
perspective -- to look up from the swamp as well as down 
from mountain tops. 62 In Nietzsche's analysis of the 
reactive the word female becomes a pejorative term. His 
remarks embody his anti-egalitarianism and his views of the 
decadence of Western culture (Platonic/Christian/Scientific) 
which suppresses nature and the creative instinct in favor 
of spirit, mind, and reason, and which levels society, thus 
prohibiting the emergence of the exceptional individual in 
the figure of the artist-creator that Nietzsche valorizes. 
Nietzsche's thought is hierarchical in a non-political and 
relative sense. It alternates between different perspectives 
that are part of an "order of rank 1163 that consists of 
relative gradations between the noble, active, affirmative 
master morality and the base, passive, negative slave or 
herd morality. The herd is associated by Nietzsche with 
social existence, which he saw as the imposition of 
uniformity. 64 The herd individual is seen by society only as 
a function of the larger group and values him/herself only 
62 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 223. 
63 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §228. 
64 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §354. 
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as this function. 65 While this is an affirmation of a life 
that is good for some, what Nietzsche is rejecting is not 
any particular judgement but the very tendency on the part 
of society to make general judgements about the value of 
life and impose unconditional codes "as if there were such a 
single theory with a character of its own, capable of being 
praised or blamed by some uniform standard. 1166 For 
Nietzsche, it is impossible to prescribe what anyone should 
be -- the individual must create his own life. Like the 
ascetic, the herd is motivated by revenge or envy of those 
who can maintain their distance from the crowd. 
The careful reader understands that these are not 
differences of class but differences between individuals in 
terms of their attitudes towards life. According to 
Niet~sche, one's attitude toward life is valued positively 
if it is an affirmation of life that acts out of abundance 
and love and negatively if it is a denial of life that 
results from hunger and dissatisfaction. This goes beyond 
the distinction between those who idealize life as being or 
those who can accept change, destruction, and becoming. 
Thus, the will to life as becoming can be that of Dionysian 
affirmation or a nihilistic hatred that wants to destroy. 
The will to immortalize similarly can come from artistic 
65 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §116. 
66 Nehamas 135. 
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love or from a tyrannical, reactive will that turns 
idiosyncrasy into binding law. 67 For Nietzsche the 
affirmative/reactive is the important distinction and he 
valorizes the creator who acts out of a sense of the 
fullness and value of his/her own life without attempting to 
create values for all and who is opposed to a herd mentality 
that acts out of revenge and imposes its standards on 
everyone. 68 The creator, as I indicated above (page 11) 
embodies both male and female characteristics. What is noble 
is a matter of self-overcoming: the ability to say "This is 
my good and my evil." 6 9 
Reactive "woman" takes two forms: "woman" as ideal and 
"woman" who plays with truth "as if it were a fetish," using 
it to her own advantage. "Woman" in the first sense is the 
Eternal Feminine -- woman as hypostatized ideal (woman as 
such, truth as such) or woman who herself identifies with 
67 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §370. 
68 Hatab 341. 
69 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §257. 
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such ideals. 70 Nietzsche says, "Woman wants to become self-
reliant -- and for that reason she is beginning to enlighten 
men about 'woman as such': this is one of the worst 
developments of the general uglification of Europe ... " and 
"even now truth finds it necessary to stifle her yawns when 
she is expected to give answers. In the end she is a woman: 
she should not be violated. 1171 "Woman" in the second sense 
collaborates with the idealism of men: 
Woman, conscious of man's feelings concerning 
women, assists his efforts at idealization by 
adorning herself, walking beautifully, 
dancing, expressing delicate thoughts; in the 
same way, she practises modesty, reserve, 
distance -- realizing instinctively that in 
this way t92 idealizing capacity of the man 
will grow. 
Seduction is here applied as a reactionary force, as 
deception with a bad conscience. 
The passages on women and feminism in Beyond Good and 
~ (§232-239) are the last part of a larger section titled 
"Our Virtues." The major themes of this section set the 
70 Nietzsche is using Goethe's Eternal Feminine from 
the last lines of Faust in order to parody its idealism. 
That his translator Hollingdale seems not to have noticed 
this, and remarks "das Ewig-Weibliche, Goethe's coinage in 
the last lines of Faust ("The eternal-feminine draws us 
aloft") is often the object of Nietzsche's mockery, 
apparently because he cannot see any meaning in it," is poor 
reading (Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols 69n). Nietzsche 
says of the Eternal Feminine " -- I do not doubt that every 
nobler woman will resist this faith" (Beyond Good and Evil 
§236). 
71 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §232 and §220. 
72 Nietzsche, Will to Power §806. 
36 
context for reading the passages on "woman." Nietzsche here 
addresses the "first born of the twentieth century" and 
stresses both the need to maintain an order of rank and the 
necessity of suffering as the molding force of the 
exceptional individual. In his defense of anti-conventional 
morality Nietzsche defends the exception against its 
opposition from the mediocre bourgeois norm -- from the 
revenge of the limited and their pity: 
... it is immoral to say: "i;gat is right for 
one is fair for the other." 
... the general welfare is no ideal, no goal, 
no remotely intelligible concept, but only an 
emetic -- that what is fair for one cannot by 
any mea~~ for that reason alone be fair for 
others. 
Nietzsche's arguments against equality and feminism have to 
be read from the perspective of his insistence that the 
concept equality had so far served to level society and make 
it average and his insistence that no new reactionary ideals 
or binding conceptions of how individuals must function be 
established -- his call for the individual willing to 
experiment and create new values for his/herself. 
It is in this sense that Nietzsche calls feminism a 
backwardness, and a "weakening and dulling of the most 
feminine instincts."75 Here feminism appears as a 
73 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §221. 
74 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §228. 
75 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §239. 
37 
continuation of decadent Western (and predominantly 
masculine) culture by attempting to speak for "woman as 
such." Feminism is equated in this sense with idealization. 
Thus, Nietzsche, here and elsewhere, makes his remarks about 
feminists as abortive females, or remarks, in reference to 
"woman as clerk," that "woman is retrogressing."76 Thus also 
Nietzsche writes: 
"Emancipation of women" -- that is the 
instinctive hatred of the abortive woman, who 
is incapable of giving birth, against the 
woman who is turned out well -- the fight 
against the "man" is always a mere means, 
pretext, tactic. By raising themselves 
higher, as "woman in herself," as the "higher 
woman," as a female "idealist," they want to 
lower the general rank of woman; and there is 
no surer means for that than higher 
education, slacks, and political voting-
cattle rights. At bottom, the emancipated are 
the anarchists in the world of the 'eternally 
feminine,' the underprivileged w99se most 
fundamental instinct is revenge. 
Given Nietzsche's own basis for assigning a positive or 
negative value to a perspective, "the emancipated woman" is 
here condemned by Nietzsche not because she adopts the goals 
of equality per se, but because she adopts these values from 
within a herd morality, motivated by revenge, and attempts 
to legislate for all. Yet it is just this kind of writing 
that gives the reader pause, even when the context and 
function seem under interpretative control. It is not really 
76 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §239. 
77 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 267. 
clear whose revenge is speaking. The same hand that writes 
that the perfect woman is of a higher, rarer type than the 
perfect man also reinscribes Socrates' last words: "O 
Criten, do tell someone to take those women away! 1178 As 
Derrida claims, "perhaps it simply must be admitted that 
Nietzsche himself did not see his way too clearly there:" 
He was, he dreaded this castrated woman. 
He was, he dreaded this castrating woman. 
He was, he loved this affirming woman. 
At once, simultaneously or successively, 
depending on the position of his body and the 
situat~~n of his story, Nietzsche was all of 
these. 
Nietzsche's "remarks on woman call into question the 
38 
ideal or the idol of feminism and anti-feminism -- woman as 
such, in herself, engendered in terms of what should be the 
case for or the condition of women as human beings."80 To 
Nietzsche, feminism is not progressive but regressive in 
that women take their place in masculine society only if 
they castrate themselves. This resonates with a contemporary 
feminist concern that the attempt to gain political, 
economical, and social equality by participation in a male 
78 Nietzsche, Human All Too Human, trans. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) §337; Human 
All Too Human §437. 
79 Jacques Derrida, Spurs, trans. Barbara Harlow 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979) 101. 
SO Gayle Ormiston, "Traces of Derrida: Nietzsche's 
Image of Woman" Philosophy Today 28 (Summer 1984): 180. 
39 
society must avoid relapsing into patriarchal practices and 
values. 
In a related context I would include Nietzsche's remark 
on the scholarly woman: 
When a woman has scholarly inclinations there 
is usually something wrong with her sexually. 
Sterility itself disposes one towards a 
masculinity of taste; for man
8
is, if I may 
say so, "the sterile animal." 
It is the association of sterility and masculinity that is 
striking. Statements like this and the one above were 
written both to provoke and to eliminate the reader who 
could not or would not be drawn in by them to struggle with 
Nietzsche's texts. Here it is necessary also to bring in 
Nietzsche's critique of the "scholarly type," in which the 
Scholar (male) is depicted as an old maid who can neither 
beget nor give birth and whose wisdom has the odor of the 
swamps. 82 The modern objective spirit may deserve care and 
honor, but can be no goal and thus it is also "nothing for 
women" -- science in the form of disinterested objectivity 
offends the modesty of all real women, who "know" that 
everything is a matter of interest. 83 Once again women are 
criticized when they adopt the decadent Western values that 
Nietzsche rejects. 
8l Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §144. 
82 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §206; Zarathustra 
125. 
83 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §207 and §127. 
40 
Setting Nietzsche's remarks on "woman" in context and 
explicating their function is not the end of any 
interpretation of "woman" in his text. As Allison Ainley has 
written, the feminist reader 
who wishes to question the singular, unified 
self implicated with patriarchal systems 
cannot accept a purely mimetic view of 
language and consequently requires a more 
complex understanding8~f "woman" in Nietzsche's writings. 
The reason one would want to question the rational concept 
of the self along with Nietzsche is that gender 
constructions are interrelated with our ontological, 
epistemological constructions of a rational, autonomous self 
-- to undermine the former requires the more general 
subversion of the latter. In other words, women are 
determined not only by their social and political status but 
also by the logical processes through which meaning is 
created. 85 Rationality, male power, and language as 
"phallocratic" discourse are the objects of deconstruction 
"because of [their] coextensivity with the history of 
Western metaphysics, a history inseparable from political 
economy and from the property of man as holder of 
84 Alison Ainley "Ideal Selfishness: Nietzsche's 
Metaphor of Maternity" in Exceedingly Nietzsche, ed. David 
Farrell Krell and David Wood (New York: Routledge, 1988) 
118. 
SS Alice Jardine, Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and 
Modernity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985) 44. 
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property."86 In this context, how do Nietzsche's feminine 
metaphors fare? Are they a reduction of women to woman and 
to seduction, a typical male appropriation characterized by 
the observation that "where woman and her domains are 
employed as a metaphor for some other human enterprise, the 
latter is viewed as belonging exclusively to man?" 87 Is 
Nietzsche a male philosopher dressing up like a woman? 88 
While Nietzsche's "woman" is stereotypical in some of 
her attributes, his use of "woman" exceeds familiar 
stereotypes. "Woman" as Nietzsche's lever to deconstruct 
rationalism disrupts not only rationality but gender 
differences and hierarchies. Nietzsche does not reduce 
"woman" to any particular image or totality, but affirms 
multiple possibilities. 89 If "progress in the life of reason 
86 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Displacement and the 
Discourse of Woman" in Displacement: Derrida and After, ed. 
Mark Krupnick (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983) 
185. 
87 Eva Feder Kittay, "Woman as Metaphor" Hypatia 3/2 
(Summer, 1988): 79. 
88 Kelly Oliver, "Nietzsche's Woman" Radical Philosophy 
48 (1988): 25. 
89 Gender here refers to masculine/feminine, not 
male/female. Where masculine and feminine are cultural masks 
that can change, the biological sexes remain, in fact 
Nietzsche insists on the "war of the sexes" as the necessary 
tension that generates the creative individual (Hatab 341). 
Nietzsche writes in the Gay Science "if both partners felt 
impelled by love to renounce themselves, we should then get 
-- I do not know what; perhaps an empty space?" (319). 
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is a struggle to transcend the feminine" 90 where the female 
is not even a self but only the object of knowledge (active 
male reason/mind/science applied to passive female 
sensation/matter/nature), then in deconstructing truth 
Nietzsche deconstructed the female object of knowledge as 
well. He both reverses the ancient Western sexual 
hierarchies 
Active/Passive 
Reason/Intuition 
Head/Heart 
Father/Mother 
Form/Matter 
Logos/Pathos 
Culture/Nature 
Intelligible/Sensible 
Truth/Fals~ly 
Self/Other 
in which the first element of each pair is both masculine 
and superior -- the male half an "idealized" version of the 
female -- and valorizes the second feminine member. Beyond 
reversing the hierarchical pairs, however, Nietzsche 
undercuts the differences between them. The pairs are no 
longer opposites but interrelated, the sexual differences 
blurred, the sex they "belong" to questionable and engaged 
in a perspectival tension that flip-flops eternally. 
Nietzsche uses parody, style, and paradox to question all 
90 Genevieve Lloyd, "Texts, Metaphors and the 
Pretensions of Philosophy," Philosophy and Literary Theory 
69 (1986): 98. 
91 Helene Cixous, ''Sorties" in New French Feminisms, 
ed. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1981) 90. 
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"ideals" -- woman amuses herself in his texts beyond the 
grasp of norms and normalizing. His work tries to show that 
there are no universal hierarchies we must accept, only the 
imposition of a certain way of speaking, of a certain way of 
life. 
Given the paradoxical, ironical aspects of Nietzsche's 
writing, it is still possible to do what many traditional 
philosophers have done and accord to the signature 
"Nietzsche" a system based on what Nietzsche believed about 
life, culture, knowledge, and truth (and those who do so 
usually leave "woman" out of their account). And yet, a 
careful reading of his texts also cannot avoid the 
possibility that Nietzsche's own metaphorical style(s) and 
irony suggest, that Truth inevitably sets itself up as an 
ideal, that in language what one wants to say is always 
subverted, that "we will always have a God [here understood 
in a more than religious sense] as long as we believe in 
grammar." Because a metaphor cannot be translated without 
remainder or without loss, the concept "metaphor" (one must 
see the paradox here) at least remains and is itself 
dependent upon a system of truth for its meaning. 92 The 
possibility exists that Nietzsche's ultimate affirmation of 
the Eternal Return is vicious circle and that Nietzsche's 
92 Derrida, ''White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of 
Philosophy " in Margins, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982) 219. 
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views are a consolation that justifies a particular life 
Nietzsche's. Nietzsche himself claims that his views are his 
own and that there is no one way. He wanted no disciples, 
only readers who could use what he said to create their own 
way. 
The use of the metaphor "woman" as a central vehicle 
that bears Nietzsche's truths displaces all normative truth. 
"Woman" as a metaphor for metaphor is the subversive body in 
Nietzsche's texts. It is this very subversion that has 
become so important to the contemporary discourse of 
deconstruction and interpretation. But for the danger of 
presuming to read intention into any text in the name of 
Nietzsche, one would like to say that this is deliberate, 
that Nietzsche "knew" what he was doing, that there are 
textual clues that enable us to argue for Nietzsche's 
control of his text. Nietzsche perhaps intended to command 
"woman" as his strategy, practising "the multiplication bf 
antagonistic metaphors in order better to control or 
neutralize their effects," 93 while in undermining this 
control shows us as a way of writing that truth is both 
impossible and unavoidable. And one is tempted (Dionysus is 
the Tempter God) to see a plan in this, a carefully plotted 
labyrinth. Yet it is impossible for the reader to say what 
Nietzsche believes about "woman" -- they are his truths. 
93 Derrida, "White Mythology" 214. 
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Here the reader is forced to realize that her goals 
guide her reading. Mine are the affirmation of Nietzsche's 
affirmative woman and the reading of "woman" as a strategy 
women can use. It is Nietzsche himself who says if you want 
to know what I mean, then find the force that gives a new 
sense to what I say, and hang the text upon it. 94 Thus the 
feminist reader can laugh at Nietzsche's outrageous remarks 
(and in doing so echo Nietzsche's own laughter) and use, not 
what he said but how he said it, as the powerful weapon it 
is in the deconstruction of the opposition 
masculine/feminine -- no longer given but cultural 
constructions that permit multiple possibilities and 
differences. And, if it is necessary for now to be "men" 
because equality, power, and salaries are defined in male 
terms, here too Nietzsche provides a precedent. It is 
possible to fight for these same things out of a sense of 
abundance and affirmation, not imposing uniformity and 
reducing differences to similarities but respecting each 
individual's right within feminism to find their own way. As 
the feminist writer Julia Kristeva has argued, women must 
enter the patriarchal world but at the same time constantly 
expose that thought. 95 Nietzsche has also written that 
94 Giles Deleuze, "Nomad Thought'' in New Nietzsche 145. 
95 Andrea Nye, Feminist Theory and the Philosophies of 
M..an (London and New York: Croom Helm, 1988) 148. 
the philosophic spirit always had to use as a 
mask and cocoon the previously established 
types of the contemplative man ... in order 
to be able to exist at all; the ascetic ideal 
for a long time served the philosopher as a 
form in which to appear ... the ascetic priest 
provided until the most modern times the 
repulsive and gloomy caterpillar form in 
which alone ;ge philosopher could live and 
creep about. 
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Could "woman" become in the same way "that many-colored and 
dangerous winged creature" that emerges form the caterpillar 
"man" 97 using the patriarchal world as temporary shelter? 
Fittingly enough, Nietzsche himself precedes the aphorisms 
on "woman" in The Gay Science with the aphorism "Only as 
creators!" in which are these lines: 
What was at first appearance becomes in the 
end, almost invariably, the essence and is 
effective as such. How foolish it would be to 
suppose that one only needs to point out this 
origin and this misty shroud of delusion in 
order to destroy the world that counts for 
real, so-called "reality." We can destroy 
only as creators. -- But let us not forget 
this either: it is enough to create new names 
and estimations and probabilities in
9
§rder to 
create in the long run new "things." 
96 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 115-116. 
97 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 116. 
98 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §58. 
CHAPTER II 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF NIETZSCHE RECEPTION 
The interpretation that I have just offered has, as a 
type of reading influenced by Derrida, its own historical 
context in the reception of Nietzsche. The metaphor "woman'' 
has had no significance in Nietzsche interpretation until 
recently, beginning with the 1970s. Taking seriously what 
Nietzsche writes about "woman" and women, instead of 
dismissing these remarks as irrelevant rhetorical aspects of 
primarily philosophical texts, is relevant to the 
development of feminism during this same period. This alone 
would not necessarily result in any change in the general 
views of Nietzsche as a misogynist, for feminist readers can 
(and do) take Nietzsche's remarks literally and treat his 
texts as examples of a type of sexism. 1 "Woman" is still not 
seen as an integral part of Nietzsche's writing, except in a 
negative way. Reading Nietzsche's remarks affirmatively, as 
I have done, also requires taking the literariness of his 
texts seriously -- a reading that no longer tries to read 
1 For example, see Ellen Kennedy, "Nietzsche: Women as 
Untermensch" in Women in Western Political Philosophy, ed. 
Kennedy, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1987) 179-201; Kelly 
Oliver, "Woman as Truth in Nietzsche's Writing," Social 
Theory and Practise 10 (1984): 185-200; and Kelly Oliver, 
"Nietzsche's Woman: The Poststructuralist Attempt to Do Away 
with Women," Radical Philosophy 48 (1988): 25-29. 
Nietzsche according to traditional philosophical 
conventions, extracting a series of arguments, but pays 
attention to the styles and rhetoric of his texts as 
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philosophy. This attitude toward interpretation also appears 
in the late 60s and 70s -- first in France -- among 
philosophers and literary critics who challenged the 
traditional divisions of academic disciplines and the 
~1 
conventions of traditional philosophy, history, and literary 
criticism. The works of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault 
are important here. Derrida in particular combines a concern 
for feminist issues with an attention to Nietzsche's styles 
that reveals a different, affirmative "woman." 
Derrida and Foucault represent the most influential 
contemporary strains of Nietzsche reading, but the character 
of their interpretations differs greatly from that given to 
his texts by earlier readers. Nietzsche interpretation has 
passed through a number of transformations since the first 
generation of his readers. The relative importance of a 
particular sequence of readers has also changed. Today the 
genealogy Nietzsche/Heidegger/Foucault/Derrida is the most 
significant and establishes the importance of Heidegger in 
Nietzsche interpretation, yet for Heidegger a different 
sequence was important, including Ernst Bertram, Ludwig 
Klages, and Alfred Baumler. No history of Nietzsche's 
readers could hope to be complete as the list would have to 
include not only a multitude of philosophers and cultural 
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analysts, but all the writers of literature and poetry who 
found inspiration in Nietzsche's works. Further, there is 
the relationship of Nietzsche to Freud and psychology. 
Therefore, in offering a brief history of Nietzsche's 
readers with the intention of showing how "woman" has come 
to be of significance in Nietzsche interpretation, I must 
narrow my focus primarily to his philosophical readers with 
emphasis from Heidegger to the present. 
Nietzsche's pre-world war I reputation was based 
primarily on his fame as a prose stylist, poet, essayist, 
and culture critic. 2 His work was important more to young 
artists and writers of the period from 1890-1915, who 
identified with his cosmopolitanism in their own efforts 
against mid-19th Century German parochialism. 3 A few 
philosophical interpretations were made, in particular those 
by the Danish critic Georg Brandes, one of Nietzsche's first 
supporters whose "Aristokratischer Radikalismus" in the late 
1880s discussed the themes of Nietzsche's Genealogy of 
Morals, and Hans Vaihinger, whose Nietzsche als Philosoph 
(1902) interpreted Nietzsche philosophy as an extension of 
2 David Farrell Krell, "Analysis" in Nietzsche: The 
Will to Power as Art (vol. 1) by Martin Heidegger, trans. 
Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1979) 238. 
3 J. Hollingdale, Nietzsche (London: ARK, 1985) 196. 
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his own "philosophy of as-if (Die Philosophie des Als-Ob)." 4 
However, Nietzsche's appeal was more as a exemplary 
personality admired by those who wanted something new and 
rejected bourgeois German life in seeking a regeneration of 
German culture. Nietzsche first became a legendary figure in 
the hands of Stefan Georg (1868-1933). 5 Georg played a role 
in the late nineteenth century German literary revival and 
restoration of German lyric poetry. Against modern mass 
society, Georg instituted an elitist cult of the artist. 6 
Two of the most important figures in early Nietzsche 
literature were disciples of the Georg circle: Ernst Bertram 
and Ludwig Klage~. 7 Bertram's very influential Nietzsche: 
Versuch einer Mythologie (1918) was concerned with 
Nietzsche's individuality, not his philosophy. 8 Bertram, in 
a chapter titled "German Becoming" added Nietzsche to a 
lineage that began with Luther, and ran through Novalis, 
Holderlin, and Lessing to Nietzsche as unique individuals 
4 Georg Brandes, "Aristokratischer Radikalismus" in .2..Q. 
Jahre Philosophische Nietzsche Rezeption, ed. Alfredo 
Guzzoni (Konigstein/Ts: Hain, 1979) 1-15; Hans Vaihinger, 
"Nietzsche's Wille zum Schein" 90 Jahre 25-28. 
5 Walter Kaufmann 9. 
6 Hajo Holborn 401-404. 
7 Kaufmann 12. 
8 Kaufmann 12. 
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who embodied a German essence. 9 Bertram dominated discussion 
of Nietzsche in the 20s and 30s. 10 He portrayed a Nietzsche 
that was "the typically ambiguous one," a duality whose 
contradictions made any systematic or contextual analysis 
unnecessary. 11 In the process of legend-making Bertram 
discarded parts of Nietzsche's thought, especially that of 
the Eternal Return. Nietzsche's philosophy was buried under 
the emphasis on his prophecy and his personal life, 
particularly his insanity, a factor that remains even in 
later readers like Jaspers (1936) and Bataille (1945). For 
the Georg circle Nietzsche was not only a legend but one who 
had predicted Germany's conditions after World War I and 
stood as its judge, pointing the way to a cultural 
revaluation. 12 Along with the Kulturphilosophie, and its 
emphasis on Nietzsche as Immoralist, Anti-Christ, and the 
Overman, developed the reading of Nietzsche as a philosopher 
of Life and the search for new values immanent in life 
rather than transcendent. 13 Here, Ludwig Klages ("Die 
psychologischen Errungenschaften Friedrich Nietzsches -- Ein 
9 Krell, "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 1) 239 and 
"Analysis," in Nietzsche: Nihilism (vol. 4) by Martin 
Heidegger (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987) 265. 
lO Krell, "Analysis," in Nietzsche: Will to Power as 
Knowledge and as Metaphysics (vol. 3) by Martin Heidegger 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1987) 273. 
11 Cited in Kaufmann 74; Kaufmann 13. 
12 Krel 1, "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 1) 240. 
13 Guzzoni, "Vorwart" in 90 Jahre viii. 
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Selbstbericht," 1920) provided a different reading of 
Nietzsche as a psychologist and of the Will to Power as the 
biological basis of psychological drives. Klages called 
Nietzsche the founder of modern psychology. 14 Nietzsche's 
psychological achievement is described as delineating the 
battle between the ascetic and the Dionysian, although his 
Will to Power remains trapped in the ascetic -- "dieses 
grosste Fesselnsprenger der Menscheit selber ein Gefesselter 
war."15 Klages valorizes the Dionysian, developing a 
philosophy of ''orgiastics" that, according to D.F. Krell, 
exalted life with "even wilder abandon than Zarathustra."16 
Alfred Baumler, professor of philosophy in Berlin from 
1933-1945 began the metaphysical interpretation of Nietzsche 
in the 1930s with his Nietzsche. 17 Baumler argued that 
Nietzsche's important work was his notes "edited" into ~ 
Will to Power as his intended magnum opus, not the works 
14 Henri F. Ellenberger 272. Klages own psychology had 
affinities to Nietzsche, especially in his notion that 
consciousness carried out only what the unconscious had 
begun -- the building of images. The intellect "turns into 
stone" through concepts. Klages "nimmt ... leidenschaftlich 
die Partei des bewusstlos-bildenden Lebens, gegen die der 
bewussten Wissenschaft, des bewussten Geistes, des Willens 
zur Unterwerfung der Natur." (Cited in Heinrich Schmidt, 
Philosophisches W6rterbuch (Leipzig: Alfred Kroner Verlag, 
1934) 331). 
15 Krell, "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 1) 242. Quote 
cited in Guzzoni 32. 
16 Krell, "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 1) 242 
17 Krell, "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 4) 269; Guzzoni 
viii. 
published during Nietzsche's lifetime. Baumler rejects the 
Eternal Return because it impresses being on becoming and 
contradicts the system of the Will to Power -- the Eternal 
Return "cancels" eternal becoming. 18 Baumler rejects both 
Klages' psycho-biologistic interpretation and Bertram's 
mythologizing, presenting Nietzsche as the last great 
thinker of the West. 19 He argues for a systematic 
interpretation of Nietzsche's work as metaphysics. In the 
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1930s and 40s Baumler was the authority on Nietzsche, whose 
commentary accompanied most of Nietzsche's published works 
during this period. As a leading Nietzsche scholar Baumler 
did a great deal of damage to Nietzsche's later reputation 
by claiming him for the Nazis (Nietzsche und der 
Nationalsozialismus, 1934), explaining away Nietzsche's anti 
Germanism and assimilating him into the German "spirit," 
presenting Nietzsche and Hitler as "joint" opponents of 
democratic-parliamentarian bourgeois society. 20 Both Klages 
18 Baumler, "Der Wille als Macht," in 90 Jahre (ed. 
Guzzoni) 52: "[der ewigen Wiederkunft] ... das Bild des 
ewigens Werdens auf zuheben und ein Bild des ewigen Seins an 
die Stelle zu setzen .... Indem der Begriff der ewigen 
Wiederkunft erscheint, verschwindet der heraklitische 
Charakter der Welt." 
19 David Farrell Krell, "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 3) 
269. 
20 David Farrell Krell "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 4) 
271. 
and Baumler exalt part of Nietzsche at the expense of the 
whole. 21 
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Jaspers, Heidegger, and Karl Lowith belong to the same 
general period as Baumler, and all reject his efforts to 
assimilate Nietzsche into National Socialism. 22 For Lowith, 
Nietzsche is also a systematic philosopher, the key to whom 
is nihilism -- bounded by the death of God and man's 
homelessness and the "self-surmounting of nihilism in 
eternal return. 1123 Jaspers' and Heidegger's approaches to 
Nietzsche are both guided by their own philosophies. Thus 
Jaspers' Nietzsche is a precursor to existentialism and 
Heidegger's Nietzsche is the last metaphysician whose 
philosophy ended metaphysics. 24 Here, Nietzsche is the last 
because in interpreting Truth as an error he is still 
21 Karl Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche (Garden City: 
Anchor Books, 1967) 190: "In his ingenious aversion to will 
and spirit, Klages divides Nietzsche and declares him to be 
an 'orgiastic' philosopher of the 'body' and the 'soul,' 
retaining the Nietzsche of the Dionysian philosophy at the 
expense of the Will to Power and to nothingness. In his 
desire for battle, Baumler interprets Nietzsche of the Will 
to Power and to nothingness as an "heroic realist" and 
political philosopher at the expense of the Dionysian 
philosophy of Eternal Return." 
22 By 1934 Heidegger had resigned his rectorship of the 
University of Freiburg and had become increasingly critical 
of Nazi ideology (See Krell, "Introduction" to Heidegger's 
Basic Writings (New York: Harper and row, 1977) 29). 
23 Lowith 192. 
24 Kaufmann wryly says of Heidegger that it is "one of 
the major efforts -- certainly the bulkiest one -- of the 
later Heidegger: important for those who want to understand 
Heidegger" (Kaufmann 500). 
55 
identifying truth with the metaphysical project of truth as 
correctness, at the same time revealing the emptiness of 
that project. Thus for Heidegger as well, Nietzsche opens a 
new way -- that of the renewed questioning of the Being of 
beings (Heidegger's lectures, although presented during this 
period, were not published until 1961). Jaspers' 
interpretation extends elements of the Lebensphilosophie 
attributed to Nietzsche. Nietzsche "obeys a dialectic 
without realizing it" by living through it. He is the 
''sacrifice" whose insanity is a symbol for the total risk of 
himself in the identification with absolute negativity. 25 
Yet, Nietzsche's negation of transcendence brings about its 
own reappearance. His thoughts intentionally contradict 
themselves in a self-consuming philosophy that cannot be 
transmitted, only experienced. Nietzsche's will to say Yes 
opens the way for the philosophy of Existenz -- the 
authentic knowledge of existence. 26 
Heidegger's Nietzsche is very significant to recent 
postmodern interpretations of Nietzsche, most of which are 
counter interpretations to his. Before considering Heidegger 
I want to bring attention to one other interesting aspect of 
Nietzsche's early reception in the context of Nietzsche as 
culture critic. This is the New Morality movement within 
25 Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche (Tucson: The University of 
Arizona Press, 1965) 447. 
26 Jaspers 443. 
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German feminism in turn of the century Germany. For most of 
this first generation of readers, Nietzsche's misogyny was 
taken for granted -- Nietzsche was the "Frauenfeind." 27 
However, within the feminist movement a form of radical 
feminism developed that was based on new libertarian ideals 
of sexual morality.28 
Helen Stocker was the primary founder of this movement 
and she conceded that Nietzsche was the dominant early 
influence on the New Morality (Die neue Ethik) she espoused, 
refuting the common belief that Nietzsche was anti-female. 29 
She argued that Nietzsche taught women to be spiritually 
independent, reject a narrow bourgeois existence, and break 
free of existing convention through self-conquest and the 
liberation of their individual creative powers. By 1903 she 
was against marriage, arguing that "he taught them to reject 
the old conventions of sexual morality as well as the old 
restrictions of their role in life."30 
27 Ellen Kennedy 181; R. Hinton Thomas, Nietzsche in 
German Politics and Society 1890-1918 (La Salle: Open Court, 
1983) 83. 
28 Richard Evans, The Feminist Movement in Germany 
1894-1933 (London and Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 
1976) 115. 
29 Evans 117. That Nietzsche was influential in the New 
Morality is apparent not only from the writings of Helen 
Stocker, but from her opponents, who blamed Nietzsche as the 
''villain" and his revaluation of values as the source of 
their excesses (Thomas 84-85). 
3o Evans 119 
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This was an extension of feminism into women's personal 
lives which called for women to prescribe their own scale of 
values and placed more emphasis on the fulfillment of a 
woman's nature -- especially her biological nature than 
on social roles or political equality. 31 The New Morality 
sponsored homes for unwed mothers, abortion, free love, 
contraception, and the idea that marriage was a form of 
prostitution. According to Hinton Thomas in his chapter "The 
Feminist Movement and Nietzsche," Helen Stocker was "the 
most Nietzsche-oriented and most intelligent exponent of 
this hoped for ethical revolution." 32 Stocker was a major 
mediator for Nietzsche within the feminist movement, but 
most knew about him mainly by hearsay as the author of 
Zarathustra. 33 
In 1904 a Mothers' League (Mutterschutz) was formed 
(for unmarried mothers) based on the New Morality, and 
Stocker played a prominent role. 34 The New Morality and the 
Mothers' League polarized the women's movement and aroused a 
great deal of hostility. 35 In 1909 Mutterschutz was rejected 
31 Thomas 88; Evans 138. 
32 Thomas 87. 
33 Thomas 91. 
34 Evans 122. 
35 Evans 137. 
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by the general organization for German women's groups. 36 
Temporarily liberalism, Social Darwinism, and Nietzsche were 
combined in an ideology that blended the most libertarian 
and individualist elements of each. 37 
These elements could not remain combined for long. The 
social and national aspects of Social Darwinism and 
Nietzschean individualism were ultimately inimical to each 
other. By 1915 Social Darwinism was the chief force in 
Mutterschutz. 38 The emphasis on woman's fulfillment of her 
nature as biology developed into a concern for the race, and 
Helen Stocker would say that the care for the coming race 
was the driving force of Mutterschutz (adding that this was 
a different orientation than Nietzsche's). 39 
The combination of Nietzsche with Social Darwinism by 
the proponents of the New Morality shows an opportunistic 
use of Nietzsche's "woman." If they rejected the supposed 
misogyny of Nietzsche's texts, they failed to heed his 
arguments against essentialism and identity, and thus 
assimilated "woman" to a biological conception of her nature 
-- one that was coopted by a masculine demographic, even 
racist, politics. This early attempt to make use of 
36 Thomas 83. 
37 Evans 138. 
38 Thomas 92. 
39 Thomas 92. 
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Nietzsche's affirmative "woman" failed because the radical 
implications in Nietzsche's texts could not yet be read. The 
only mode of interpretation available to them was that of 
Nietzsche as culture critic, the champion of "selfhood" 40 
who appealed to a generation concerned with Individualitat 
and PersOnlichkeit. 41 
In Wilhelmine Germany Nietzsche was adopted by those 
who resisted conformity, while among nationalists he was 
unpopular and associated with moral degeneracy -- although 
various "mottos'' were lifted from Nietzsche's texts. 42 
Ironically, Nietzsche would later be adopted by a different 
set of nationalists -- National Socialists -- who gathered 
arguments against ideas of a democratic order and found ways 
to press Nietzsche into service with the aid of Nietzsche's 
sister and her control of the Nietzsche archives. 43 
Nietzsche's Will to Power was afterwards understood in a 
political sense. 44 Nietzsche as metaphysician and as 
"politiker" appeared together in the readings by Baumler. 
The Will to Power came to be associated with political 
40 Thomas 80. 
41 Thomas 2. 
4 2 Thomas 126, 128. 
43 Walter Kaufmann, in his chapter titled "The Master 
Race" accuses Nazi authors, including Baumler, of 
unscrupulousness as Nietzsche-readers, abandoning 
scholarship in taking remarks out of context. 
4 4 Hollingdale 198. 
power, especially by those not directly familiar with 
Nietzsche's writing. It is in this environment that 
Heidegger began his lecture course on Nietzsche. 
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Because Heidegger's lectures were not published until 
1961, modern readings of Nietzsche date from Walter Kaufmann 
and his effort to free a "basically anti-political" 
Nietzsche from his association with Nazism. 45 Kaufmann's 
Nietzsche (first published in 1950) was the authoritative 
Nietzsche, especially for English-speaking readers. Kaufmann 
had made it acceptable after World War II to read Nietzsche 
again. He dominated the field of Nietzsche scholarship and 
was responsible for most of the available English 
translations. Kaufmann, along with his contemporaries Arthur 
Dante (who tried to assimilate Nietzsche to analytic 
philosophy) and J.P. Stern, reads Nietzsche as a systematic 
philosopher. Kaufmann's reading resolves Nietzsche's self-
contradiction and paradox according to an internal unity, in 
which contradictions are only temporary stopping places. 
Nietzsche's aphorisms are for Kaufmann ultimately unified by 
their character as "thought experiments" striving for an 
adequate means of expression for getting at "the objects 
themselves" in which self-overcoming, not ambiguity, is the 
key. 46 Kaufmann complained of Bertram that he "failed to see 
45 Kaufmann 412. 
46 Kaufmann 85. 
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that the self-contradictions [were] merely the stuff of 
legend and not typical of Nietzsche's thought." 47 He 
assigned Nietzsche a place in "the grand tradition of 
Western thought" and claimed that the core of Nietzsche's 
thought was the Will to Power, which was not a metaphysical 
concept but a psychological hypothesis inseparable from his 
concept of sublimation. 48 However, Kaufmann rejects what his 
reading of Nietzsche cannot account for -- the "dubious 
doctrine" of the Eternal Return and most particularly 
"woman." 
For Kaufmann as for the other readers of Nietzsche 
considered so far, "woman'' is not regarded as a significant 
aspect of his philosophy. 49 It is tempting to correlate this 
with a more general belief that women are not important and 
that even a supposed misogyny can be ignored -- the irony is 
that it is not there. If Kaufmann feels obliged to at least 
note Nietzsche's remarks and account for them because by the 
1950s they may have become increasingly embarrassing, it is 
still only to dismiss them as having any bearing on what 
Nietzsche "means." Kaufmann fails to see the significance of 
Nietzsche's "woman" and reads her right out of his 
interpretation. According to Kaufmann, 
47 Kaufmann 14. 
48 Kaufmann 204. 
49one exception is Karl Reinhardt (See page 30, above). 
Nietzsche's writings contain many all too 
human judgements -- especially about women 
but these are philosophically irrelevant; and 
ad hominem arguments against any philosophy 
on the basis of such statements seems trivial 
and hardly pertinent .... Nietzsche's 
prejudices about women nSOd not greatly 
concern the philosopher. 
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This is also the result of neglecting the importance of 
style, and establishing a split between the philosophical 
and the poetic Nietzsche. Kaufmann has had many students, 
but two in particular have distinguished themselves as 
Nietzsche scholars -- J. Hollingdale and Alexander Nehamas. 
Interestingly enough, they have opposite reactions to 
Kaufmann's "neglect" of style. Hollingdale adopts Kaufmann's 
point of view and claims that Nietzsche's importance is in 
his philosophy -- poetry is secondary. 51 Nehamas, on the 
other hand, rejects this view, arguing that Nietzsche's many 
styles are a part of his perspectivism. The multiplicity of 
style attempts to suggest that there is no single neutral 
language and to undermine the distinction between form and 
content. Nietzsche avoids dogmatism in refusing to privilege 
his authorial voice and in presenting his ideas as 
5o Kaufmann 84. Yet what are we to make of Kaufmann's 
biographical remark about Nietzsche's intolerable situation 
in which it is known "how Nietzsche felt about being 
condemned to live in a fatherless household, alone with 5 
women ... " This perhaps says more about Kaufmann's rejection 
of the place of "woman" and her supposed irrelevance than 
about Nietzsche's text. 
51 Hollingdale 203. 
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interpretations. 52 It is significant that there is a 
generational difference between Hollingdale and Nehamas, the 
latter representing more recent interpretative attempts in 
Nietzsche reading that refuse the traditional split between 
philosophy and literature. 
The most recent phase of Nietzsche interpretation is 
language oriented, paying as much, if not more, attention to 
Nietzsche as a writer and his techniques for "unmasking" 
truth, language, and thought. The key to these readings is 
the experience of nihilism, which Heidegger in the 1930s was 
the first to take seriously. Although many disagree with 
Heidegger's interpretation, contemporary interpretations owe 
a great deal to him and his intuition that the horizon of 
nihilism was fundamental. That God is dead means all eternal 
standards are gone by which truth and language traditionally 
functioned or can be measured. As Daniel O'Hara says in his 
introduction to Why Nietzsche Now?, "this most recent 
appearance by Nietzsche has been as the linguistic 
pathologist of the diverse signs of nihilism which are 
constitutive of the entire tradition of Western culture from 
the age of the Greeks." 53 This new valorization of language 
and writing since the 1960s comes from revisionary readings 
52 Alexander Nehamas 20-40. 
53 Daniel O'Hara, ''Introduction," Why Nietzsche Now? 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985) vii-viii. 
of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche -- therefore, it is 
necessary to turn to Heidegger's Nietzsche. 
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Recalling that Heidegger began his lectures against the 
background of Baumler's interpretations, it is interesting 
to note the similarities between them. Like Baumler, 
Heidegger based his interpretation on the collection of 
notes under the title The Will to Power. Also like Baumler, 
Heidegger interpreted the Eternal Return as the impression 
of being on becoming, although Heidegger does not reject the 
Eternal Return but argues for the unity of the Nietzschean 
themes of the Will to Power, the Eternal Return, and the 
Revaluation of Values. Heidegger also uses Nietzsche's note 
§617 in Will to Power similarly: taking the first line "To 
impose upon becoming the character of being -- that is the 
supreme will to power" out of context without considering 
that the rest of the note does not bear out the meaning 
attributed to it. 54 Thus the Eternal Return becomes the 
fundamental metaphysical position of Nietzsche "being as 
a whole is Will to Power, and being as a whole is Eternal 
Return of the same." 55 Heidegger argues that this 
conjunction of the Will to Power and Eternal Return in 
Nietzsche's thought returns philosophy full circle to the 
Greeks -- being is and being becomes -- in such a way that 
5 4 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 2) 201. 
55 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 2) 198. 
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Being "as such" is identified solely with the beingness of 
beings as what is present and what is purely actual. 
Heidegger assumes that Being, however enigmatic his own 
attempt to think Being, "is" prior to and separate from man 
as being. He regards traditional metaphysics as the study of 
beings, which has always taken Being apriori and thus never 
questioned Being as Being. Nietzsche brings metaphysics then 
to its furthest development because there is no longer any 
possibility for the question of Being separate from beings 
themselves. Nietzsche "fails" to reach the thought of Being 
as such. Heidegger betrays a longing, an "if only," for a 
return to origins where Being is again possible as a 
question and as a promise -- no longer forgotten in 
"beings." The secret of Being is a deep truth, the 
"unthought" horizon of cultural existence that man must 
think more authentically. Rather than an overcoming that 
tries to control, the overcoming of metaphysics ought to be 
a "step back," a thinking that "no longer omits Being but 
admits it: admits it into the originary, revealing 
unconcealment of Being, which is Being itself."56 
Although clearly influenced by Baumler, Heidegger has 
his own reasons for relegating Nietzsche to metaphysics. 
Heidegger reads Nietzsche as bringing Nihilism to its 
furthest development by reducing Being to value and will: 
56 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 3) 227. 
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"Thought in terms of the essence of nihilism, Nietzsche's 
overcoming is merely the ful f i 11 ment of nihi 1ism. 1157 There 
is not only nothing to Being itself, but nothing to beings 
as well. Nietzsche's nihilism is an unauthentic nihilism 
that does not know itself as such because it omits thinking 
the essence of nihilism, the "default" of Being. This 
default is Heidegger's way of speaking of Being as neither 
pure presence nor pure absence but paradoxically both -- a 
default that is at the same time a giving, a promise. Being 
has historically withdrawn, yet leaves behind a place 
DaSein -- in which presence and absence occur together in a 
place that defines the essence of man. Nietzsche's nihilism 
deals with actual nihilism but not with essential nihilism. 
The essence of Truth -- man's relationship to Being -- is 
abandoned for the principle of value, leading to what 
Heidegger sees as having opened the way for planetary 
dominion by machination and technology -- both the result of 
an "unconditioned anthropomorphism" and a destructive will 
to power. 58 Heidegger's concern, expressed in his essay 
"Nihilism and the History of Being" in volume 3 of Krell's 
translation, is against a "metaphysics of subjectivity" for 
which technology has become an anonymous force that has 
gained control and turned nature into a "standing reserve" 
to the point of including man himself as a mere object for 
57 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 3) 219. 
58 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 3) 174. 
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use. 59 In arguing that there is no meaning to life in itself 
except what man himself puts there, Nietzsche wills man's 
homelessness as such -- meaninglessness is now the only 
thing that "makes sense. 1160 
Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche puts an odd 
spin to Nietzsche's writing. It willfully seems to ignore 
the similarity between Nietzsche's thoughts and Heidegger's. 
It may be that Heidegger was unwilling to credit Nietzsche 
with having preceded him in his own insights. The similarity 
becomes clear in the context of Heidegger's paradoxical 
thinking of Being. Being is described by Heidegger as "not" 
-- not presence but a withdrawal that in withdrawing 
"remains in view," a duplicitous revealing/concealing self-
veiled gift that promises Being itself. 61 Being itself stays 
away: 
Thus matters stand with the concealment of 
Being in such a way that the concealment 
conceals itself in itself. The staying away 
of Being is Being itself in this very 
default .... In its default Being veils 
itself with itself. This veil that vanishes 
for itself, which is the way Being itself 
essentially occut~ in default, is the nothing 
as Being itself. 
59 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 3) 242; 248. See also 
"The Question Concerning Technology," in Basic Writings 
298. 
GO Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 3) 173. 
61 Krell, "Analysis" Nietzsche (vol. 4) 261; Heidegger, 
Nietzsche (vol. 4) 215. 
62 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 4) 214. 
Being as such is other than itself, so 
decisively other that it even "is" not. 63 
But Being as withdrawn gift, as self-veiled, is 
precisely where we encounter Nietzsche's "woman," and 
68 
precisely the point at which Derrida turns Nietzsche against 
Heidegger. Nietzsche's woman " 'give themselves,' even 
when they -- give themselves." 64 Further, as David Farrell 
Krell says, "If the 1936-37 lectures on will to power as art 
overlook woman, those on eternal recurrence neglect 
Dionysos; the two omissions ... are perhaps not 
unrelated." 65 The Eternal Return is a matter of the moment -
- the wedding of chance and necessity -- in which eternity 
is always decided. In other words, Eternal Return is time as 
transition, and very close to Heidegger's notion in Being 
and Time of ecstatic temporality -- time as transition as 
such. 66 In the Eternal Return, "Nothing ends; all begins 
again, the other is still the same, midnight is only a 
covered-over noon, and the highest noon is the abyss of 
63 Heidegger, Nietzsche (vol. 4) 215. 
64 Nietzsche §361. Translated by Kaufmann, the line 
reads "That they "put on something" even when they take off 
everything" (317). In a footnote he gives the original 
German: "Dass sie "sich geben," selbst noch, wenn sie --
sich geben." Derrida relies on the original. The "scare 
quotes" indicate a duplicity. 
65 Krell, "Analysis," Nietzsche (vol. 2) 275. 
66 Krell, "Analysis," Nietzsche (vol. 2) 278. 
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light from which we can never escape." 67 The Apollonian noon 
as absolute presence and Zarathustra's noon as the sign of 
Eternal Return are impossible to separate, indicating 
Nietzsche's problematization of his own thought in the 
vicious circle. In the Eternal Return beings are not beings 
as selves as Heidegger would have it, but have no continuous 
given identity. One finds that one is always already other -
- Nietzsche and Heidegger would seem to be standing on the 
edge of the same abyss. Several of the readers of 
Heidegger's Nietzsche have commented on the difficulty of 
separating one from the other -- whether it is Heidegger's 
Nietzsche or Nietzsche's Heidegger that is being read. 
Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacques Derrida, 
Paul Ricouer, Jacques Lacan, Sarah Kofman, and Michel 
Foucault are some contemporary philosophical and literary 
figures interested in language who have all been influential 
in the study of rhetoric -- and who have all been influenced 
by Nietzsche. 68 The editors of Nietzsche's rhetorical works 
argue that in Nietzsche's use of Ciceronian rhetoric to 
attack nineteenth century philosophy "it is possible that 
Nietzsche, like the Sophists and the Italian Renaissance 
Humanists, has been responsible for a historical reversal of 
67 Maurice Blanchet, "The Limits of Experience: 
Nihilism" in The New Nietzsche 126. 
68 Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair, David J. Parent, 
eds., "Introduction" to Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and 
Language xxi. 
the intellectual (or possibly a reunion) of these two 
historically competitive fields." 69 It is also remarkable 
that so much of the "new Nietzsche" that has taken the 
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"linguistic turn" has been the creation of French thinkers. 
In part, this is the result of the death of Walter Kaufmann, 
which left a vacuum in the control of Nietzsche scholarship, 
and in part the result of the development of a French school 
of Nietzsche interpretation that moved away from Heidegger 
in primarily two, not unrelated, directions: deconstruction 
and archeological/genealogica1. 70 The name "Derrida" 
signifies the former and the name "Foucault" the latter 
within Nietzschean interpretation, with a third figure in 
Giles Deleuze, whose Nietzsche interpretation is not 
assimilative to either direction but certainly operates in 
the same trajectory. The projects of all three could be said 
to be an extension of the questions Nietzsche poses in a 
passage from Daybreak: 
Subsequent questions -- whenever a person 
reveals something, one can ask: what is it 
supposed to conceal? From what is it supposed 
to divert the eyes? What prejudice is it 
supposed to arouse? And additionally: how for 
does the subtlety of this diss~Tulation go? 
and in what way has it failed? 
69 Gilman xii. 
70 See Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the 
Politics of Transfiguration (London: University of 
California Press Ltd, 1988) 311; Guzzoni x; O'Hara viii; 
Gilman xvii. 
71 Nietzsche, Daybreak, trans. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987) §523. 
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All three are anti-systematic, anti-humanist (in the 
metaphysical, hermeneutical sense), and anti-
representational. Common to all three as well is an 
interdisciplinary hybrid approach, one that refuses to 
confine itself to traditional academic divisions or the 
conventional methods of philosophy but annexes new contexts 
and methods from other fields. All three are concerned in 
some form with the discourse of "woman." Woman appears in 
their texts in a Nietzschean valorization of "woman" that 
turns on what has been left out of or "other" to traditional 
philosophical discourse in order to disrupt the concepts of 
logic, truth, and presence. Alice Jardine has suggested a 
neologism for this proliferation of the metaphor "woman" 
with her Nietzschean attributes: gynesis --
the putting into discourse of "woman" as that 
process diagnosed in France as intrinsic to 
the condition of modernity; indeed, the 
valorization of the feminine, woman, and her 
obligatory, that is historical, connotations, 
as somehow intrinsic to new and neces;~ry 
modes of thinking, writing, speaking. 
In the wake of Nietzsche's announcement of the end of 
man and his description of the subject as a fiction, all 
three also reinterpret the western Cartesian notion of the 
human subject, rejecting the notion of the transparent self-
consciousness of the individual subject with the aim of 
eliminating the subject as the privileged center of truth, 
72 Alice Jardine 25. This valorization is the subject 
of the following chapter. 
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knowing, language and power. Just as Nietzsche displaced the 
will from the conscious control of the individual to the in-
between anonymity of the play of forces, these writers 
emphasize the unconscious aspects of language and power. 
They turn to the investigation of where and how the 
invention of the subject developed. 
In The Gay Science Nietzsche asks: 
"Where could you find a history of love, of 
avarice, of envy, of conscience, of pious 
respect for tradition, or of cruelty? Even a 
comparative history of law or at least o; 
punishment is so far lacking completely. 3 
Here can be seen in embryonic form the projects of Michel 
Foucault, some of which include Discipline and Punish, ~ 
History of Sexuality, The Archeology of Knowledge, and ~ 
Order of Things. Foucault uses Nietzsche's genealogy as a 
research strategy, an approach to history that emphasizes 
discontinuities and arbitrariness rather than continuous, 
progressive development. Foucault rejects universals, 
intentionality, and the search for hidden meanings. He takes 
up Nietzsche's rejection of both the "true" and "apparent" 
worlds for the surface play of interpretation, in which 
everything is already an interpretation. Genealogy is 
against the search for origins and causes. It looks instead 
for "the details and accidents that accompany every 
73 Nietzsche, The Gay Science §7. 
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beginning."74 Foucault refuses causal explanations social 
practises and customs are instead studied as "sign chains" 
of ever new interpretations, transformations, and 
ruptures. 75 History is a matter of relations of force and 
domination, in which Foucault looks for the local strategies 
of power and the forms of knowledge that enable them to 
operate. Nietzsche's attack on the "will to truth" as a 
disguised form of the will to power is important to 
Foucault's understanding of the interrelationship of power 
and knowledge and his use of history as a means to engage in 
local struggles against reified interpretations. The body 
itself is changed and defined by cultural practices and 
interpretation. Foucault rejected along with Nietzsche the 
idea of the subject, which becomes for Foucault the locus of 
institutional practices within the discourse of a particular 
society. Thus an interpretation is required of how we came 
to be constituted as subjects. Foucault never explicitly 
refers to "woman" but her Nietzschean attribute as "distance 
itself" occupies a significant place in his work, that of 
the play of forces "made possible by the space which defines 
74 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in 
Foucault Reader ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1984) 80. 
75 Paul Bove, "Mendacious Innocents, or, The Modern 
Genealogist as Conscientious Intellectual: Nietzsche, 
Foucault, Said" in Why Nietzsche Now? 382. 
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them." 76 This interaction of forces has, in Foucault's 
words, a place of confrontation that is "as Nietzsche 
demonstrates ... a "non place," a pure distance [or] 
interstice " in which is staged "the endlessly repeated play 
of domination." 77 
Part of Foucault's Nietzscheanism comes by way of 
Georges Bataille (1897-1962), a reader of Nietzsche in the 
1930s and 40s who has had a great deal of importance to 
postmodern thought, although less studied than Heidegger. 
Foucault himself proclaims Bataille "one of the most 
important writers of this century."78 Bataille is a strange 
interpreter of Nietzsche, in fact, his commentary ..5J.!...t. 
Nietzsche (1945) is largely autobiographical, because 
Bataille feels that to write "on" Nietzsche would be to turn 
him into a dead object of knowledge. 79 Bataille is a "post 
structuralist"80 already in the post war period, whose works 
combine Nietzsche with Sade's radically sovereign individual 
in playing with notions of excess, transgression and 
76 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1982) 109. 
77 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" 85. 
78 Cited in Allan Megill 188. 
79 Denis Hollier, Against Architecture: The Writings of 
Georges Bataille, trans. Betsy Wing (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1989) 26. 
80 Hollier ix. 
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perversity -- the breaking of taboos and his writing of the 
sacred as a fusion of sex, violence, obscenity, and 
spirituality. A general relationship to the work of Bataille 
can be seen in Derrida's association of writing with the 
erotic and the endless play of signifiers and in Foucault's 
study of architectures (Discipline and Punish), the body, 
and transgression. Bataille was concerned with writing as 
something non-representational, non-priviledged, 
transgressive, and heterogeneous. He rejected fixed 
meanings, form, unity, being, transcendence, purpose, and 
morality for the affirmation of non-sense, even insanity 
(Bataille was drawn to Nietzsche's insanity as the sacrifice 
of an extreme individual). In Bataille "woman", especially 
as Krell's configuration of woman/sensuality/death is not 
postponed, and she appears in the form of the labyrinth and 
Ariadne's thread, both major motifs of Bataille's work. 
Bataille writes that he sees Nietzsche's theme as that of 
the total man and the problem of action. All action is 
particular and limiting, subordinating the individual's 
total character to a particular result. 81 The problem is 
then to transcend action: "Life remains whole only when not 
subordinated to a precise object which transcends it. 
Totality in this sense is essentially freedom." 82 Freedom 
81 Georges Bataille, "On Nietzsche: The Will to Chance" 
October 36 (1986): 52. 
82 Bataille 52. 
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becomes the freedom from all constraint and taboo, and thus 
associated with evil. Bataille admires Nietzsche'ss 
assessment of the value of evil, even referring to Nietzsche 
as "the philosopher of evil. 1183 Such abandonment is 
available only to the individual in extremis, and is 
reflected in Bataille's reading of Nietzsche's will to power 
as the Will to Chance and the Eternal Return as pure 
aimlessness the rejection of all goals and solutions for 
total risk. 
Of the three "versions" of current Nietzschean 
interpretation I have taken as paradigmatic, Giles Deleuze 
offers the most systematic -- systematic, however, in a 
deceptive sense. Deleuze's Nietzsche and Philosophy is based 
on an analysis of the dualisms of active and reactive in 
Nietzsche's thought in relation to those of affirmation and 
negation. Nietzsche's Eternal Return becomes the synthesis 
of active and reactive forces and the Will to Power its 
synthetic principle -- a system "as rigorous as the Kantian 
one," which transmutes nihilism and becomes the power of 
affirming. 84 Affirmation, to be unconditional, requires its 
own affirmation. Ariadne is the affirmative woman, the first 
positive feminine power, whose purpose in the system as 
83 Bataille 50. 
84 Giles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh 
Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) 68-70. 
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Dionysus' fiancee is this unconditional affirmation. 85 The 
paradox here is that Deleuze, a philosopher of difference 
like Derrida and Foucault, applies a traditional systematic 
strategy to Nietzsche interpretation in which Nietzsche's 
work becomes a philosophy of will. 86 However, Deleuze uses 
this dualistic analysis as a strategic principle, a 
temporary construction or "story" that can be abandoned 
nomadically --
an explanation that works by redescribing 
events so that they fit into a particular 
story put together for a particula9
7
practical 
purpose in a particular situation. 
In Nietzsche and Philosophy this purpose is to use Nietzsche 
to reject Hegelian dialectics and replace them with an 
affirmation of difference rather than its negation: 
The eternal return is this highest power, the 
synthesis of affirmation which finds its 
principle in the will. The lightness of that 
which affirms against the weight of the 
negative; the games of the will to power 
against the labor of the dialectic; the 
affirmation of affirmation again~~ that 
famous negation of the negation. 
In "Nomadic Thought" Deleuze describes Nietzsche as the 
dawn of counterculture -- the refusal of codification and 
85 Deleuze 186. For Ariadne as the "first positive 
feminine power," the "feminine power emancipated" see 
Deleuze 14-20. 
86 Hugh Tomlinson, "Nietzsche on the Edge of Town: 
Deleuze and Reflexivity" in Exceedingly Nietzsche (London 
and New York: Rootledge, 1988) 151. 
87 Tomlinson 159. 
88 Deleuze 197. 
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the notion of style as politics. 89 Deleuze applies the term 
nomadic to Nietzsche because it is the nomads who evade the 
codes of settled peoples: 
But if Nietzsche does not belong to 
philosophy, it is perhaps because he was the 
first to conceive of another kind of 
discourse as counter-philosophy. This 
discourse is above all nomadic; its statement 
can be conceived as the products of a mobile 
war machine and not the utterances of a 
rational, administrative machinery, whose 
philoso~sers would be bureaucrats of pure 
reason. 
Derrida is the reader of Nietzsche whose interpretation 
is the closest to my own -- the first chapter of this thesis 
can be regarded as an interpretation of Nietzsche that is 
also an interpretation of Derrida's Spurs. Against readers 
who either reject Nietzsche's "woman" as misogynistic, or 
would ignore her as unworthy of consideration, Derrida takes 
"woman" to be extremely important to Nietzsche's text. 
Derrida claims in Spurs that "it is impossible to dissociate 
the questions of art, style, and truth from the question of 
woman." 91 He uses "woman" to provide an alternative 
interpretation to Heidegger's Nietzsche that does not reject 
Heidegger entirely, as Heidegger's rejection of the 
metaphysics of presence is crucial to Derrida's own work. 
Derrida 
89 Deleuze, "Nomadic Thought" 142-143. 
90 Deleuze, "Nomadic Thought" 149. 
91 Jacques Derrida, Spurs 71. 
attempts to show that Heidegger's own path of 
escape from metaphysics could be considered 
as operative in Nietzsche's text as well. 
This is done in terms of wh~~ Derrida calls 
the question of the propre. 
Propre has connotations of proper-ty -- belonging, owning, 
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giving, taking, mastery, and possession. Derrida's propre is 
similar to Heidegger's manipulation of Ereignis, 
Eigentlichkeit, and eigen-en as terms for the mysterious 
granting of Time and Being that is governed by the duplicity 
of revealing and concealing, but which is never confronted 
in Heidegger's interpretation in the figure of the woman in 
Nietzsche's text. 93 Heidegger's interpretation is shown to 
be inadequate by its lack of attention to woman. Derrida 
brings Heidegger into his reading of Nietzsche with 
Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's "The History of an 
Error" in Twilight of the Idols. 94 Heidegger's commentary 
ignores the phrase "it becomes woman" and thus like all 
philosophy before him fails to realize that together woman 
and truth have a history the eternal feminine that 
92 Alan Schrift, "Reading Derrida Reading Heidegger 
Reading Nietzsche," Research in Phenomenology 14 (1984): 98. 
93 Krell, "A Hermeneutics of Discretion," Research in 
Phenomenology 15 (1985): 2. 
94 Nietzsche, "How the "Real World" at last Became a 
Fable," subtitled "The History of an Error," Twilight of the 
Idols/The Antichrist 40-41. The part in question reads: "The 
real world, unattainable for the moment, but promised to the 
wise, the pious, the virtuous man ("to the sinner who 
repents"). (Progress of the idea: it grows more refined, 
more enticing, more incomprehensible -- it becomes woman, it 
becomes Christian ... ). The passage ends in "with the real 
world we have also abolished the apparent world ... Incipit 
Zarathustra. 
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Nietzsche's affirmative woman disrupts. Nietzsche's "woman" 
and Heidegger's Being both have the same essential predicate 
-- the gift that is a dissimulation, neither a giving nor a 
taking away. However, where Heidegger's thought of Being 
ends in "mystery," the primordial absence in all presence, 
Nietzsche's "woman" has no mystery, no deep secrets. She is 
all surface, and for Derrida the infinite extension of a 
chain of signifiers -- there is no Being to be forgotten in 
the first place. 
Spurs is used as part of Derrida's challenge to a 
hermeneutics which searches for the true meaning of the text 
in the intention of the author. 95 He attacks Heidegger's 
hermeneutical claim to know Nietzsche's own "unthought" or 
what Nietzsche "really" wanted to say which then reads into 
Nietzsche's text truths about the question of Being that do 
not fit there. Heidegger's interpretation belongs to 
hermeneutics because the question of whether Nietzsche 
merely inverted Platonism, reversing the ideal and the 
sensual, or exceeded Platonism requires thinking Nietzsche's 
intended meaning. 96 Derrida's aim in reading instead allows 
meaning to be produced through the activity of reading 
rather than finding a meaning already present in the text. 
95 Schrift, "Reading" 89-90; 105. 
96 Derrida 83. 
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By attending to the metaphors of "woman," "truth," and 
"castration" in Nietzsche's text and their common 
attributes, Derrida argues that woman is but one name for 
the untruth of truth. 97 As veiling dissimulation, woman 
cannot be pinned down -- she neither believes in truth nor 
castration, nor in their opposites. Derrida refers to this 
as the heterogeneity of Nietzsche's text -- the absence of a 
system that would entirely account for Nietzsche's positions 
on "woman.•• 98 Truth in Nietzsche's texts is irreducibly 
plural, and with this plurality reading is "freed from the 
horizon of meaning, the truth of being." 99 Woman is the 
question of style, a style more powerful than content. She 
already knows that the question of the propre 
(possess/possessed, giving/taking) is undecidable that 
the event of Being is a non-event, and an abyss. And thus 
Derrida concludes, 
A joyful wisdom shows it well: there never 
has been the style, the simulacrum, the 
woman. Therio8ever has been the sexual 
difference. 
This brings to an end a brief history of Nietzsche's 
readers at a point -- the refusal of the sexual difference 
as such where a move to another branch of the Nietzschean 
97 Derrida 51. 
98 See Chapter I 30. 
99 Derrida 107. 
lOO Derrida 139. 
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interpretative family tree, that of French feminist theory 
is called for, particularly where "woman" is concerned 
(although the writers involved in this grouping might be 
uncomfortable with such a lineage). There are others in the 
field of Nietzsche interpretation who could be mentioned, 
particularly Paul DeMan, Maurice Blanchet, and Pierre 
Klossowski, but the general outlines of recent Nietzsche 
interpretation should now be clear. The recent proliferation 
of Nietzsche interpretation has been remarkable and is 
related to the challenges to traditional methods of 
interpretation that what is termed deconstruction, 
poststructuralism, or postmodernism are making. What should 
also be clear are the political aspects of recent Nietzsche 
interpretation. Despite Kaufmann's attempt to remove 
Nietzsche from politics, Nietzsche is ever more used in 
political battles, although the use to which he is now put 
is more appropriate than that of earlier periods. Whether it 
is Foucault's microstruggles against entrenched 
interpretations and strategies of domination, Deleuze's 
nomadic war machine, or Derrida's more literary but no less 
political attack on phallocentrism, Nietzsche is being used 
as a subversive force against the traditional hegemony of 
rationalism and rationalist systems of meaning. The writings 
of the last anti-political German have now become the 
"politics of style" or the "politics of difference," which 
have the aim of disrupting all centrist discourses 
be they phallo-centric, ethno-centric, theo-
centric, anthropo-centric, or logo-centric 
every discourse which tends to create 
undisturbable limits and order, hegemonic 
rule, .or P1bYileged, hierarchical 
opposites. 
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As Nietzsche himself recognized, no one can get more out of 
his texts than what they bring to them in the first place: 
Ultimately, nobody can get more out of 
things, including books, than he already 
knows. For what one lacks access
1
&9 from 
experience one will have no ear. 
lOl J.D. Caputo, "Three Transgressions: Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, Derrida" Research in Phenomenology 15 (1985): 75. 
102 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 261. 
CHAPTER III 
FROM METAPHOR TO THEORY 
In the refusal of the sexual difference as such 
Nietzsche's use of the metaphor "woman'' has become important 
within Derridean deconstruction and the use of 
deconstructive theory by certain woman theorists in France 
whose work is only now becoming well known in American 
academics. For these theoretical writers who would 
deconstruct even sexual identity, "woman" still functions in 
the Nietzschean sense in which she "is" no longer the 
opposite of "man'' but the very subversion of the opposition 
masculinity/femininity: 
In "woman" I see something that cannot be 
represented, something that is not said, 
something a£ove and beyond nomenclature and 
ideologies. 
Julia Kristeva 
If woman has always functioned "within" the 
discourse of man, a signifier that has always 
referred back to the opposite signifier ... 
it is time for her to dislocate this 
"within," to explode it, turn it around, and 
seize it, ... biting that tongue with her 
very own teeth to invent f~r herself a 
language to get inside of. 
Helene Cixous 
1 Julia Kristeva, "Woman can never be defined," N.fil:f 
French Feminisms 137. 
2 Helen Cixous, "Laugh of the Medusa," New French 
Feminisms 257. 
[Woman] is neither one nor two ... She 
renders any definition in~dequate. Moreover 
she has no "proper name." 
Whose twisted character is her inability to 
say what she represents. The quest of the 
"object" becomes a game of Chinese boxes. 
Infinitely receding. The most amorphous with 
regard to ideas, the most obviously "thing," 
if you like, the most opaque matter, opens 
upon a mirror all the purer in that it knows 
and is known to have no reflections.
4 
... But 
what if the object started to speak? 
Luce Irigaray 
There is also the voice of Sarah Kofman, who calls for 
the end of all oppositions, that of man as 
well as of woman, to the advantage of a 
"feminine jouissance," if by feminin5 one 
understands undecidable oscillation. 
Their concern is with language and the exclusion of women 
from language and the linguistic system, which they argue 
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has been, in its structure and history, subject to an order 
that is patrilinear and therefore masculine. 6 
The women theorists -- among whom Luce Irigaray, Helene 
Cixous, Julia Kristeva, and Sarah Kofman are most prominent 
-- take as their own starting points the deconstructive 
3 Luce Irigaray, "This sex which is not one," New 
French Feminisms 101. 
4 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. 
Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985) 
134-135. 
5 Sarah Kofman, quoted in Alice Jardine, Gynesis 140. 
The word jouissance in French is translated as pleasure, 
enjoyment, here associated with feminine sexuality and a 
certain excess. 
6 Gayatri Spivak, "French Feminism in an International 
Frame," Yale French Studies 62 (1981): 172. 
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writing of Derrida and/or Lacanian psychoanalysis. 7 They 
have been grouped together under the label "French 
feminism," but because so grouped should not be understood 
to be in agreement with each other or even feminist. They 
are better described as anti-feminist in the same sense that 
writers like Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze are anti-
humanist, rejecting ideas of universality or essentialism 
that claim common identities for all "men" or all "women" or 
an autonomous identity for the individual self. As such, 
this concern with "woman" is different from that of 
traditional feminism, which has concentrated on the social 
and political condition of female individuals assumed to 
have not only autonomous individual identities but a shared 
identity as "women" as their basis for action. 
I may seem to be leaving Nietzsche behind here, yet his 
writing has set the agenda for deconstruction or 
postmodernism, including the new French feminists, whether 
or not they agree with his "woman."8 His themes and phrasing 
appear in the work and styles of the French theorists. The 
relationship that exists between Nietzsche and his French 
readers is intertextual, which indicates the textual 
reinscription of Nietzsche's work in the work of the writers 
7 Jardine 181. 
8 See Allan Megill 's Prophets of Extremity for an 
extended discussion of the importance of Nietzsche to both 
modernism and postmodernism. 
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with whom I am here concerned -- Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault, 
Lacan, Irigaray, Cixous, Kofman, and Kristeva. This 
reinscription is more than a matter of quotation, direct 
reference, and common themes. It is more -- to use the word 
"text" according to its etymological roots in the Latin 
"texere" (to weave) -- that Nietzsche forms the warp upon 
which the later complex fabric of deconstruction and 
theoretical "feminism" has been woven, just as Nietzsche 
used the canons of Western culture as the warp of his own 
writings. 
In the work of these French critics "woman" has become 
a prevalent metaphor -- politically and rhetorically since 
1968 Roland Barthes' "metaphor without brakes." No longer 
just a question of the interpretation of Nietzsche, "woman" 
has acquired a life of her own. Alice Jardine, among others, 
notes how, whether in the work of Derrida, Lacan, Deleuze, 
Lyotard, Baudrillard, Michel Serres, in Foucault and Barthes 
as a "present absence," and in the writings of the French 
feminists, 
"she" is created from the close exploration 
of semantic chains whose elements have · 
changed textual as well as conceptual 
positions, at least in terms of valorization: 
from time to space, the same to other, 
paranoia to hysteria, city to labyrinth, 
9 mastery to non-mastery, truth to fiction. 
9 Jardine 38. 
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This "woman" is not biological but linguistic -- a question 
of language, and the role of the unconscious, the subject 
and the symbolic. Basic to Derrida's notion of writing, 
Foucault's discourse, and Deleuze's machines is their 
critique of the concept of the subject. In place of the 
subject is proposed the space of alterity within which the 
subject is configured. This space -- otherness, chaos, 
distance -- has always connoted the feminine in Western 
thought and thus the valorization of alterity, difference, 
and otherness involves "a putting into discourse of 
'woman. ,.,lO This discourse owes a significant debt to 
Nietzsche. 
"Woman" thus becomes part of the twentieth century 
Western epistemological crisis over certainty and 
representation. 11 In general it is a question of loss of 
control and responses to this loss -- the "death" of the 
Cartesian subject, dialectics, and metaphysical Truth, and 
the loss or dislocation of a Western cultural identity based 
on what is white, European, and male. 12 Rather than shore 
up failing ideals, postmodern writers characteristically 
valorize this loss and affirm difference instead of 
lO Jardine 115. 
ll See Introduction, above. 
12 Jardine 68; Jardine, "Opaque Texts and Transparent 
Contexts: The Political Difference of Julia Kristeva" in~ 
Poetics of Gender, ed. Carolyn G. Heilbrun and Nancy K.C 
Miller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 100. 
identity. In doing so, they turned to Nietzsche's critique 
of truth, Freud's science of the unconscious, and 
Heidegger's destruction of presence as onto-theology, as 
texts already elaborating this loss of control. 13 
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One feminist critic, Susan Borda, has aptly noted that 
the dominant philosophical dualisms are overdetermined with 
respect to race, gender, and class such that the 
hierarchical opposition of reason/unreason may be coded many 
different ways, as, for example, male/female, white/African, 
or spiritual/material. 14 The second half of each opposition 
is defined as different and marginal. She says: 
It is no accident, surely, that the 
beginnings of the current philosophical re-
assessment of objectivism and foundationalism 
followed close on the heels of the public 
emergence, in the 1960s and 1970s, of those 
groups margi~~lized by the dominant 
metaphysics. 
Traditionally authority and credibility have been granted to 
those who can transcend everything that would mark them as 
different and therefore marginal, subjective, and 
unreliable. 16 The anti-humanism the postmodern writers 
espouse is based on a rejection of traditional movements of 
13 Jardine, Gynesis 71; Jardine, "Opaque Texts'' 101. 
14 Susan Bardo, "Feminist Skepticism and the 'Maleness' 
of Philosophy," The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988): 626. 
15 Bardo 628. 
16 Naomi Scheman, "Further Thoughts on a 'Theoretics of 
Heterogeneity,"' The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988): 631. 
liberation because of a conviction, in the wake of 
Nietzsche, that the western conceptions of the True, the 
Good, the Right, the Ethical, and the Natural are bound up 
with means of oppression -- and the complicity between 
oppression and Western ideas of the Same. 17 
I indicated above that the new French feminisms -- as 
anti or post-feminisms -- take as theoretical starting 
points the work of Derrida and Lacan. In order to follow 
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what has become of "woman" in these new feminisms and off er 
a general survey and analysis of this work by writers who 
are still "readers of Nietzsche" (once removed), a further 
description of Derridean thought and the introduction of 
Lacanian theory is necessary. Although Lacan is a starting 
point, the French feminists and Derrida generally write 
against Lacan's phallocentrisrn. Alice Jardine describes this 
as a "battle" between Lacanian and Nietzschean 
philosophies. 18 
Lacan is known for his structuralist interpretation of 
Freud which defines the unconscious as "structured like a 
language" -- not only man speaks but in and by man language 
speaks. 19 Thus there is an affinity between Lacan and 
17 Jardine, "Opaques Texts" 99-100. 
1 8 Jardine, Gynesis 149. 
19 Spivak, "Translator's Preface," Of Grammatology by 
Jacques Derrida (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1976) lxii. 
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Derrida in their concern for textuality. The relationship of 
Lacan and Derrida is complex and not relevant here except 
for the way in which "woman" has become (always been) 
involved. The difference appears in Lacan's notion of the 
privileged signifier. 
When the child enters what Lacan calls the symbolic, 
it enters/acquires language. At the same time it has 
developed a new "linguistically imprisoned" concept of 
itself as a subject -- alienated from the old, from itself 
as it was before language with the mother. This "self" as a 
referent is lost, and unknowable -- the unconscious, which 
Lacan refers to as Other. It is beyond language, feminine, 
lost but ever pursued and desired. For Lacan, "signifiers 
are the symbols that relate the subject through the 
structure of desire to the unconscious." The "master" 
signifier of these signifiers is the phallus 
For the phallus is a signifier, a signifier 
whose function ... lifts the veil perhaps 
from the function it performed in the 
mysteries. For it is the signifier intended 
to designate as a whole the effects of the 
signified, in that the signifier con~btions 
them by its presence as a signifier. 
20 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 1977) 285. According to Spivak, 
"Preface," lxv. "This is not the phallus as an actual organ, 
penis, or clitoris [but] the phallus as a signifier that can 
come to take the place of all signifiers signifying all 
desires for al 1 absences" (Spivak, "Preface" lxv). 
The phallus is the privileged signifier of 
that mark in which the role of th~ 1 logos is joined with the advent of desire. 
The language the child enters into is governed by the 
symbolics of the phallus or "male subject as absolute 
metaphor" and the child's identity fixed according to a 
92 
system of paternal names. This Law of the Father through the 
mediation of the Phallus denies a "place" to women except at 
second hand. 22 Thus for Lacan sexual difference is built 
into language, thought, and culture. Presence is masculine 
and absence or lack feminine, and the woman as mother is 
left behind in the narcissism of the "Pre-symbolic" once the 
child has created (or projected) his/her fiction of a self 
in/through language. The Law of the Father controls. Thus 
femininity cannot be expressed and the woman's identity is 
unstable. 23 
There is no Woman [La Femme], with a definite 
article for designating the universal. There 
is no Woman because -- I have already 
ventured the term, and why should I think 
twice about it 24 with regard to her essence, 
she is not all. 
Woman is what escapes discourse -- Woman as Other, as man's 
unconscious. To attempt to speak outside of the Law of the 
Father would result in hysteria, or psychosis. Woman is 
21 Lacan 287. 
22 Nye 139-140. 
23 Nye 140-141. 
24 Lacan, Seminar XX: Encore 68 (cited in Jardine, 
Gynesis 164). 
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imprisoned ever more firmly is a system in which only men 
can speak -- Other in the sense in which she has always been 
other and silent. 25 Lacan makes "woman" Other in the sense 
of the Eternal Feminine. 
Derrida argues that any privileged signifier is yet 
another metaphysical, transcendental longing for presence, 
similar to Heidegger's hope of a return to Being. Lacan is 
an example of that imposed patriarchal authority that 
feminism must subvert. 26 For Derrida signifier and signified 
-- or word and meaning -- are interchangeable, not merely 
arbitrarily related within a structural system. Nothing 
"is," there are only continuous sign chains of differences 
or traces to be deciphered, the sign a tool to be used 
provisionally. Meaning has no unique referent but 
"disseminates'' itself endlessly. 27 There can be no 
transcendental signified (Being) or signifier (Phallus) that 
stabilizes the system, nothing behind or beyond language 
that serves as an ultimate referent or truth. 
25 In the words of Helene Cixous, "Here we encounter 
the inevitable man-with-rock, standing erect in his old 
Freudian realm, in the way that, to take the figure back to 
the point where linguistics is conceptualizing it "anew," 
Lacan preserves it in the sanctuary of the phallus (¢) 
"sheltered" from castration's lack! Their "symbolic" exists, 
it holds power -- we, the sowers of disorder, know it only 
too well" (Cixous, "Laugh of the Medusa," New French 
Feminisms 255). 
26 Nye 188. 
27 Spivak, "Preface" xvi. The affinity between 
Nietzsche and Derrida should also be clear here. 
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According to Derrida and the French feminist writers, a 
feminist reversal of the paternal power would simply 
reinstate phallocentrism in the form of an inverted 
sexism. 28 There is also the complicity of phallocentrism 
with logocentrism within/as metaphysics. With his concept 
of the Phallus as master signifier to our symbolic system of 
meaning Lacan has taken this implicit relationship and made 
it explicit. Metaphysics cannot be escaped or replaced, 
because new alternate truths still affirm the logical, 
metaphysical presence of truth as such. Thus for Derrida the 
necessary tactic is not only a reversal which valorizes the 
feminine, but a play or parody with symbolic structures and 
with truth, as Nietzsche's Woman played with the truth -- an 
affirmative deconstruction that displaces rather than 
confronts. Language is shown not to be structured around a 
transcendental signifier that provides a center for meaning 
but a kind of writing, a writing that "obliterates what it 
imprints and disperses what is says." 29 Writing is the trace 
of a permanent alterity: 
28 Derrida, Spurs 65: "And in truth, they too are men, 
those women feminists so derided by Nietzsche. Feminism is 
nothing but the operation of a woman who aspires to be like 
a man." 
29 Stefano Agnost.i, "Introduction," Spurs 23. 
Nietzsche puts "knowing" under erasure, Freud 
"the psyche," and Heidegger, explicitly, 
"Being" ... the name of this gesture effacing 
the presence of a thing and yet keeping it 
legible, in Derrida's lexicon is "writing," 
-- the gesture that both frees us from and 
guards us ~bthin, the metaphysical 
enclosure. 
Thus feminism in the form found in Derrida, Cixous, 
Irigaray, Kristeva, and Kofman goes beyond the attempt to 
define rights and equalities for women within the existing 
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system to the question of the relationship of that system to 
existing notions of truth and the necessary subversion of 
metaphysical truth as that "space" where gender, culture, 
and power have been established for Western society in a 
particular way. They make explicit a kind of feminism that, 
as I have tried to argue, was implicit already in 
Nietzsche's work. Their "woman" is outside of all mastery 
and appropriation -- for "woman" meaning is multiple: 
The question of the woman suspends the 
decidable opposition of true and non-true and 
inaugurates the epochal regime of quotation 
marks which is to be enforced for every 
concept belonging to the sy~tem of 
philosophical decidability. 
It would seem unlikely that such a system as Lacan's 
could find a place in feminist criticism, yet some 
feminists, particularly Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray 
(who was Lacan's student until she challenged his theories 
30 Spivak, "Preface" xl i. 
31 Derrida, Spurs 107. 
in The Speculum of the Other Woman) found in Lacan a 
powerful analysis of patriarchal relations. 32 In accepting 
this analysis, both argue that women can operate only as 
"other." Any new feminist position would have to be 
articulated from the more difficult position of otherness 
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and decentralization. Lacan's theories are not accepted as 
absolute, but as a story of a particular kind -- the 
paternal logos -- that has ruled throughout Western 
civilization. It cannot be simply overturned, but can be 
subverted -- ''mined" for gaps and inconsistencies. 33 One 
way they attempt to do this is through the valorization of 
the maternal. All four theorists assert in some form this 
maternal, the rediscovery of the mother the pre-
Oedipal. 34 All recognize a certain valorization of woman as 
a means toward a destabilization of the dominant hierarchy 
in the "rehabilitation of the repressed." In claiming to 
expose the connections of gender to Western habits of 
thought, all of these theorists aim to subvert the 
traditional hierarchy from within or from its margins. 
32 Nye 141 (Canceling of Seminar in Nye 169 (73n)). 
33 Nye 190. 
34 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and 
Criticism after Structuralism (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1982) 173. See also Domna Stanton, "Difference on 
Trial: A Critique of the Maternal Metaphors in Cixous, 
Irigaray, and Kristeva," The Poetics of Gender 159. 
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Yet, if feminine practise is negative, undermining the 
stability of established structures, it must avoid a retreat 
into separatism. Julia Kristeva argues that women must both 
enter the masculine world and undermine patriarchal claims 
to authority and logical certainty. 35 A permanent analytical 
attitude -- "autocritique" -- must be maintained that 
prevents the feminine, the maternal, the "l'ecriture au 
maternal" from ceasing to be a heuristic tool and becoming a 
new dominance. 36 
For Kristeva, the critical force of Freud and Lacan is 
their outline of the symbolic contract as one of sacrifice 
or castration, in which language constitutes meaning through 
a separation of the subject from a presumed state of nature 
and the introduction of a network of differences. 37 The 
question for women today, Kristeva argues, is "What can be 
our place in the symbolic contract?" the social 
contract. 38 Whether this is a matter of structure or a 
sociohistorical conjuncture is difficult to evaluate. She 
argues that "we can speak only about a structure observed in 
a sociohistorical context, which is that of Christian, 
35 Nye 148. 
36 Domna c. Stanton, "Difference on Trial" 173-174. 
37 Kristeva, "Women's Time," Critical Theory Since 
l.i§.5., ed. Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle (Tallahassee: 
Florida State University Press, 1986) 477. 
38 Kristeva 477. 
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Western civilization and its lay ramifications. 1139 She 
identifies two feminist positions that have operated so far, 
one a complicity with this contract to acquire what power it 
offers, the other variations on a utopian countersociety 
that posits a maternal myth of the archaic mother. 40 
Kristeva advocates a third attitude that understands the 
very dichotomy man/woman as metaphysics, a feminism that 
breaks free of a belief in Woman and "brings out the 
singularity of each woman." 41 She argues that the violence 
of the social contract needs to be relocated in the interior 
of every identity so that 
the habitual and increasingly explicit 
attempt to fabricate a scapegoat victim as 
f oundress of a society or countersociety may 
be replaced by the analysis of the 
potentialities of victim/executioner which 
character~~e each identity, each subject, 
each sex. 
Unlike Irigaray and Cixous, Kristeva refuses to prescribe 
any particular relationship to the "feminine" other than 
39 Kristeva 477. 
4° Kristeva 477-481. If Kristeva herself calls for a 
maternal semiotics (Nye 142), the purpose is not the 
creation of a matriarchal society but an exploration of the 
"before" of language. If the Mother must be repressed, she 
remains as an abyss -- the dangerous Mother -- and possible 
threat. Further, many feminists would object that they do 
not fit either of these two categories, or find them 
troubling. Kristeva is quite explicit in her claims that 
"the assumption by women of executive, industrial, and 
cultural power has not, up to the present time, radically 
changed the nature of this power" (Kristeva 479). 
41 Kristeva 483. 
42 Kristeva 484. 
women's need to both enter and undermine the masculine 
world. 43 Her work has focused on the politics of male 
sexuality and the examination of the operation of the 
"feminine" in patriarchal thought. 44 
Where Kristeva's primary texts are those of Freud and 
Lacan, the primary text of both Irigaray and Cixous is 
Derrida. Luce Irigaray is critical of Lacan. 45 Yet he and 
Derrida, particularly Derrida's Spurs, are indirectly 
present in her texts. 46 Her writing is also a question of 
style -- fluid, figural, parodic, allusive -- a 
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deconstructive play with words and syntax. Like Derrida (and 
Nietzsche), Irigaray in Speculum traced the systematic 
exclusion of the feminine in the core texts of Western 
thought from Plato on, the "prior logic" that has made the 
masculine the presence against which all else is measured 
and that has established the function of woman as that of 
either absence or mirror. 47 Her aim is to show the feminine 
as a positive, rather than merely negative, presence -- the 
feminine as a value in its own right "beyond the looking 
glass." She creates new metaphors based on female sexual 
43 Jardine, "Opaque Texts" 110. 
44 Jardine, "Opaque Texts" 113. 
45 Nye 148. 
46 Carolyn Burke, "Irigaray Through the Looking Glass," 
Feminist Studies 7/2 (1981): 293. 
47 Nye 151; Culler 58. 
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organs and autoeroticism in order to reappropriate what 
psychoanalytic theory has rejected. 48 The feminine "object" 
is neither inert nor stable, but can "speak for itself." Yet 
this should not be taken as, or reduced to, a kind of 
biological essentialism. It remains a "Derridean" 
deconstructive move, privileging the subordinate side of the 
male/female imaginary. If the feminine functions as the 
"outside" of discourse, the continuum out of which 
distinctions are carved, Irigaray would claim that they are 
not carved without remainder or reminder. 49 In This Sex 
Which Is Not One Irigaray writes that 
repeating/interpreting the way in which, 
within discourse, the feminine finds itself 
defined as lack, deficiency, or as imitation 
and negative image of the subject, they 
[women] should signify that with respect to 
this logic a disru~bive excess is possible on 
the feminine side. 
Helene Cixous also urges a rediscovery of the female 
body. 51 This rediscovery takes the form of an l'ecriture 
feminine, the name Cixous gives to Derrida's notion of 
48 Nye 151-153. See Irigaray's This Sex Which is Not 
~' trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1985). 
49 Margaret Whitford, "Luce Irigaray's Critique of 
Rationality," in Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy, ed. 
Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1988) 114. 
50 Irigaray, This Sex 78. 
51 Nye 198. 
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writing as ''feminine operation" 52 Cixous is also a reader of 
Bataille. Her l'ecriture feminine is associated with notions 
of excess -- the "reprise of a female Dionysian experience, 
the 'way out' of the patriarchy and the living of joyful 
lives at the margin of excess."53 Women have a privileged 
relation to writing because they have an acceptance of 
(m)otherness and a "bisexuality" that men lack. 54 She calls 
for women to "write their bodies," and seize the opportunity 
to speak and to transform phallocentrism, to "write the 
other history. 1155 For Cixous, women are already postmodern, 
and their prototype is Molly Bloom: 
We have no womanly reason to pledge 
allegiance to the negative. The feminine (as 
the poets suspected) affirms: " ... And yes," 
says Molly, carrying Ulysses off beyond any 
book and tow~~d the new writing; "I said yes, 
I will Yes." 
Cixous moves away from Irigaray in arguing for 
separatism -- a feminist withdrawal from male dominated 
publishing, academics, and politics rather than 
52 Derrida, Spurs 57. 
53 Robert Con Davis, "Woman as Oppositional Reader: 
Cixous on Discourse," Papers on Language and Literature 24 
(1988): 272. 
54 Culler 173. 
55 Cixous, "Sorties" 96. Cixous claims that "it is 
impossible to define a feminine practice of writing," in 
"Laugh of Medusa" in New French Feminisms 253. 
56 Cixous, "Laugh" 255. 
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compromise. 57 Cixous herself rejects criticisms of idealism 
or mysticism, yet they are often made. 58 Julia Kristeva 
rejects this type of thought as a utopian retreat into 
private language and the abdication of power. 59 Cixous moves 
away from Derrida as well in arguing that women through 
their bodies have a privileged access to writing. 
Derrida is also a primary text for Sarah Kofman, who is 
described as an ''orthodox Derridean" (if there is such a 
thing). 6° Kofman is more openly anti-feminist, arguing that 
feminism is a phallocentrism "no matter what the sex of its 
speaker." She is interested, like Derrida, in "woman" and 
her attributes -- "woman" as the undecidable oscillation 
that subverts metaphysical claims to know. 61 She agrees with 
Derrida about Nietzsche and the affirmative, Dionysian 
woman. Kofman finds this woman in "Baubo," who signifies 
affirmation as the female double of Dionysus. Baubo, a Greek 
fertility figure that is associated with female genitalia 
and the Goddess Demeter, represents fecundity, protean life, 
57 Spivak, "Displacement" 204. 
58 For instance, that Cixous is guilty of an inverted 
humanism (Spivak, "Displacement" 207). 
59 Nye 204; Nye 207. 
60 Jardine, Gynesis 199. 
61 Jardine, Gynesis 199. 
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and the Eternal Return -- one who knows that despite death 
life can come back indefinitely. 62 
Such a brief survey is bound to be unsatisfying to 
anyone intrigued by such arguments. It does, however, set 
out a general outline of the way in which Nietzsche's use of 
a metaphor has become part of a certain theoretical 
discourse. There remain a few reservations on which to 
remark. Helene Cixous argues that "Woman is obviously not 
that woman Nietzsche dreamed of who gives only in order 
to. 1163 Her woman gives without return. However, this seems 
to ignore the Nietzschean move to place "woman'' outside of 
propriation and make the "gift" undecidable. 
This is less significant than a more general concern, 
not directed at Nietzsche in particular (but in his 
direction) by Luce Irigaray: 
62 Sarah Kofman, "Baubo: Theological Perversion and 
Fetishism," from Nietzsche et la scene philosophique (1979) 
in Nietzsche's New Seas ed. Michael Gillespie and Tracy 
Strong (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988) 197-
198. The reference to Baubo comes from The Gay Science: 
"Perhaps truth is a woman who has reasons for not letting us 
see her reasons? Perhaps her name is -- to speak Greek 
Baubo?" (Nietzsche's Preface to The Gay Science §4). 
63 Cixous, "Laugh" 259. 
Yet, ever more hemmed in, cathected by hopes, 
how could she articulate any sound from 
beneath this cheap chivalric finery? How find 
a voice, make a choice strong enough, subtle 
enough to cut through those layers of 
ornamental style, that decorative sepulcher, 
where even her breath is lost. She has yet to 
feel the need to get free of fabric, reveal 
her nakedness, her destitution in language, 
explode in the face of them all, words too. 
For the imperious need for her shame, her 
chastity -- duly fitted out with the belt of 
discourse --, of her decent modesty, 
continues to be asserted by every man. 64 
This points to a distrust of a discourse of "woman" 
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conducted by men. Alice Jardine also argues that "woman" in 
the hands of male writers and theorists indicates the 
possibility of a certain male paranoia, even a new "ruse of 
reason" that consists of a male combatting or socializing of 
the crisis of monotheism and reintegrating the unnameable 
into the Western symbolic system before it collapses. 65 
Some feminists argue that theories of deconstruction 
and difference have a value in exposing a male logic, yet 
remain a matter of men's self-criticism. I would here repeat 
my own claim from above that the feminist reader can use 
Nietzsche's "woman'' as a powerful deconstructive lever. The 
writers I have just discussed do use "woman" this way. In 
her many examinations of "deconstruction" Gayatri Spivak 
argues that this is not just another instance of masculine 
use of woman as object, but the means to displace masculine 
64 Irigaray, Speculum 143. 
65 Jardine, Gynesis 99-102. 
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discourse itself, along with a new willingness on the part 
of some male philosophers and critics to question the 
hegemony of the male "we. 1166 
Such arguments also appear to some feminists to abandon 
women's historical experience and oppression for ideology 
and theory, yet it is more a matter of the exploration of 
the ''other" side of this oppression. Others, notably Sandra 
Gilbert and Susan Gubar, argue that this emphasis on 
theories of writing as feminine ignores a history of writing 
by women that goes back to Emily Dickinson, Virginia Woolf, 
and Gertrude Stein. 67 There has always been tension between 
theory and practise. In this case they are not incompatible. 
They are incompatible if the criticism assumes that the new 
French Feminisms are making apriori arguments or claims 
about the essence of language or its immutable structure. 68 
They are not. The force of Nietzsche's argument, as it has 
been extended in the work of Derrida and the new feminisms, 
is the uncovering of a genealogy -- the historical existence 
of a system of hierarchical oppositions specific to Western 
culture within which the masculine/feminine are embedded. If 
something is historical and specific to a particular 
66 Spivak, "Displacement" 207. 
67 Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, "Sexual 
Linguistics: Gender, Language, Sexuality," New Literary 
History 16 (1985): 516. 
68 Gilbert and Gubar 519. 
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perspective it can be changed, but not easily, particularly 
not when it has been in full swing for a few thousands of 
years. Is Western discourse "caught within the metaphysical 
or phallogocentric limit?1169 The writers who appear here 
claim that it is. Few would disagree, whether empirically or 
theoretically oriented, that there are persistent patterns 
in which active/passive has also been coded male/female and 
in which the power of creating and control of the word 
(God/Father/Author/Possessor/Begettor) has been appropriated 
by men. But it is the question of propriation that is being 
asked. 
69 Spivak, "Displacement" 173. 
CONCLUSION 
Nietzsche can be accused of misogyny only at the 
expense of disregarding the function of "woman" as a primary 
metaphor that is fundamental to Nietzsche's texts. "Woman" 
is the disruptive figure that displaces not only 
metaphysical truth but the ancient basis for Western 
stereotypes, within which Nietzsche is valorizing "woman" in 
an attempt to revalue the values of western culture. Reading 
this affirmative woman in Nietzsche's texts requires paying 
attention to the way in which Nietzsche constantly parodies 
the form in which these truths are represented. As I have 
already argued, this parody is pronounced in the name of 
woman. 
Nietzsche "ventured" the claim that he "knew" women as 
part of his Dionysian dowry. 1 The "first psychologist of the 
eternal feminine" made this claim because he was able to 
operate multiple perspectives in his writing. Not only is 
this "most multifarious art of style" the early model for 
postmodern texts that attempt to erase themselves as they go 
rather than establish new Truths, but the source of most of 
the confusion over what Nietzsche wrote about women. Most of 
Nietzsche's more notorious remarks about women, as I argue 
1 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 266. 
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above, are to be found among his analysis of the reactive 
perspective, a perspective in which "woman" as the Eternal 
Feminine either collaborates with the idealism of men -- the 
idealization of woman as such, truth as such -- or herself 
identifies with such ideals. Also, Nietzsche's arguments 
against feminism depend on his insistence that the concept 
of equality is a false ideal that has so far served to level 
society and make it average and that has created binding 
conceptions of how individuals must function. In this sense 
a feminism that makes claims for "woman as such" is not 
progressive but regressive. Nietzsche's remarks on woman 
question all feminisms and anti-feminisms -- any attempt to 
legislate for others instead of oneself. 
"Woman" exceeds familiar stereotypes as a strategy that 
disrupts not only rationality but gender differences and 
hierarchies -- the subversive body in Nietzsche's texts --
that is not reduced to any particular image or totality, but 
affirms multiple possibilities, an affirmative strategy that 
women can use. Once this strategy of reading "woman" 
acquired an interpretive force in the texts of postmodern 
thought such as those by Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze, 
"woman" became a prevalent metaphor for the valorization of 
alterity, otherness, and difference in the subversion of the 
opposition masculinity/femininity as no longer a given but a 
cultural construction. The women writers associated with the 
label "French feminism" take up these claims, making 
explicit what was implicit in Nietzsche's work. 
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Thus Nietzsche's use of this metaphor of "woman" 
against traditional conceptions has become part of 
postmodern theoretical discourse based on claims for the 
historical existence of a system of hierarchical oppositions 
specific to Western culture and the necessary subversion of 
metaphysical truth as that "space" where gender, culture, 
and power have been established for Western society in a 
particular way and within which the masculine/feminine are 
embedded. This is not a denial of gender difference but its 
deconstruction gender is relative to particular 
constructions in specified contexts, no longer the absolute 
distinction between male/female (or other invidious 
oppositions) that has been used to justify different 
treatment and enforce normative rules. It also claims that 
political effectiveness need not be based on sameness as the 
ground for action -- a sameness that denies the diversity of 
individuals. Nietzsche's Woman is not the traditional Other 
to man and culture that is hidden, silent, and marginal 
but, paradoxically, figures the use of this otherness to 
disrupt the pair Same/Other without reducing it to either 
side. Nietzsche's idea of difference requires thinking it in 
terms that do not duplicate the old oppositions. 
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